James Talcott Construction, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-427 C, 2019 BL 72711, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 4, 2019)

In May of 2010, the United States, acting through the Department of Defense (the “Government”) awarded a contract to James Talcott Construction, Inc. (“Talcott”) to replace existing housing for military families at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana.  Talcott was required to construct thirteen buildings, each comprising seventy housing units.  Each building was to be constructed with concrete foundations and wood framing, and the project’ design called for wooden floor joists and subfloor decking to be enclosed in crawlspaces.  The contract stated that the “structural drawings and specification represent the finished structure… [but] do not indicate the method of construction.  The contractor will provide all measures necessary to protect the structure during construction.”  The plans and specifications were silent as to ventilation of the crawlspaces.

Skyrise Construction Group, LLC v. Annex Construction, LLC, 2019 BL 55071 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20, 2019)

Subcontractor Skyrise Construction, Inc. (“Skyrise”) sued general contractor Annex Construction, Inc. (“Annex”) for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Wisconsin and Illinois trade practices statutes.  Skyrise primarily based its claims on an assertion that the parties entered into a subcontract, which Annex breached when it removed Skyrise from the project and completed the work with an alternative subcontractor.  Both Skyrise and Annex filed motions for summary judgment.  The District Court denied Skyrise’s motion and granted Annex’s motion.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners, 2019 BL 36988, 2 (Wash. App. Div. 2 Feb. 05, 2019)

On January 8, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington reversed and remanded in part a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a tunnel-boring construction case.  Specifically, the Court clarified that the three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims begins to run as soon as the aggrieved party becomes aware of the factual elements of the claims.  It does not matter whether the underlying cause of the claims remains disputed.

This article was published in Law360 on March 11, 2019. © Copyright 2019, Portfolio Media, Inc., publisher of Law360. It is republished here with permission.

In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel Inc. determined that parties may not contractually agree to expand judicial…

Servidone, Inc./B. Anthony Constr. Corp., J.V. v. State of New York, No. 2016-05238, 2019 BL 7232 (App. Div., 2d Dept. Jan. 09, 2019)

Servidone, Inc./B. Anthony Construction Corp., J.V. (the “Contractor”) and the New York State Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) entered into a construction contract to reconstruct and replace bridges on Route 59 in New York State. The Contractor retained L.M. Sessler Excavating & Wrecking, Inc. (the “Subcontractor”) to perform the demolition and disposal portion of the project.

Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC, No. 17-16510, 2019 BL 26363 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019)

Aspic Engineering and Construction Company (“Aspic”), a local Afghan subcontractor, entered into multiple subcontracts with ECC Centcom Constructors and ECC International (“ECC”), the prime contractor, to construct buildings and facilities in Afghanistan.  The subcontracts contained terms and conditions “applicable to all U.S. Government subcontracts,” and mandated that Aspic owed ECC the same obligations that ECC owed to the federal government.  The subcontracts also incorporated multiple Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) clauses, including FAR 49.2 through 49.6, which govern the recovery of expenses in the event a contractor is terminated for convenience, i.e. required documentation and procedures.

Hagen Constr. Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., No. JKB-18-1201, 2019 BL 36862 (D. Md. Feb. 04, 2019)

This case arises out of the construction of a pediatric outpatient center in southern New Jersey.  Plaintiff subcontractor Hagen Construction, Inc. (“Hagen”) filed suit in New Jersey state Court against defendant general contractor Whiting-Turner Construction Co. (“W-T”), seeking reimbursement for labor inefficiency costs incurred as a result of W-T’s alleged project mismanagement.  Hagen claimed it incurred additional costs to repeat work and remobilize to multiple areas because it was not afforded unimpeded access or timely supply of necessary materials and information.  Once the case was removed and transferred to Maryland federal Court, W-T moved for partial summary judgment on the portion of Hagen’s breach of contract claim reflecting labor inefficiency costs.

Univ. of Iowa Bd. of Regents v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, No. 17-0949, 2019 BL 7069 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 09, 2019)

Modern Piping, Inc. (“Modern Piping”) and the University of Iowa, Board of Regents, and State of Iowa (“University”) entered into two construction contracts, both containing arbitration provisions.  Disputes arose related to each contract and Modern Piping filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA).  The University filed an action against AAA, seeking to enjoin it from arbitrating the disputes.  AAA filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that arbitral immunity doctrine applied.  The district court granted AAA’s motion and the University appealed.

The doctrine of arbitral immunity provides that arbitrators are immune from liability for acts performed in their arbitral capacity and generally shields all functions which are integrally related to the arbitral process.  The doctrine applies to a claim against an arbitrator where the claim effectively seeks to challenge the decisional act of an arbitrator or arbitration panel.  The immunity extends to associations administering arbitration procedures.

United States ex rel. Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Hirani Eng’g & Land Surveying, P.C., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200829 (D.D.C. Nov 28, 2018).

The case involved the construction of a levee wall on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.  In September 2010, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded Hirani Engineering & Land Surveying, P.C. (“Hirani”) the prime contract for the project.  Hirani’s surety was Colonial Surety Company (“Colonial”).  Hirani subcontracted the majority of the work to American Civil Construction, LLC (“ACC”).  Following a series of disputes and project delays, the Army Corps terminated Hirani.  ACC then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking over $2 million in damages under the Miller Act as well as state law for breach of contract.  After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of ACC.

As part of its claim, ACC sought damages for costs related to idle equipment at the project site.  Although the claim was only a small part of ACC’s overall claim, the court’s approach was noteworthy.  ACC asserted that all of the costs were recoverable under the Miller Act.  Conversely, Hirani and Colonial argued that standby equipment expenses were per se unavailable under the Act.  The court disagreed with both parties and held that, although the Miller Act permitted a contractor to recover for idle equipment, it could not do so in all instances.

Ferrara v. Peaches Café LLC, 2018 NY Lexis 3244 (November 20, 2018)

COR Ridge Road Company, LLC (“COR”), as landlord, entered into a 10 year lease with Peaches Café, LLC (“Peaches”).  The lease imposed certain construction requirements on Peaches for it to operate its restaurant, including adherence to specific electrical specifications. The lease also provided that COR approve of any improvements to the premises, that Peaches submit to COR all design plans for the electrical work, and that any improvements made become part of the realty.  Angelo Ferrara (“Ferrara”) performed some of the electrical work.

After Peaches closed its business, Ferrara filed a mechanics lien against the property for more than $50,000 Peaches owed him, noticing both Peaches and COR. Ferrara subsequently sought to foreclose on the lien.  Both Ferrara and COR moved for summary judgment in the foreclosure action, and the trial court granted COR’s motion and dismissed the complaint against it. The Appellate Division granted Ferrara’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the validity of the lien on COR’s property. COR appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed.