K-Con, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Army, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31196 (Fed. Cir., November 5, 2018)

In September 2013 K-Con, Inc. (“K-Con”) entered into two contracts with the government to supply and construct pre-engineered metal buildings for a laundry facility and a communications equipment shelter.  The government issued both contracts using Standard Form 1449, entitled Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items.  The contracts’ terms did not contain any requirement to provide a performance or payment  bond.  Nor did they include FAR 52.228-15, which requires performance and payment bonds on construction contracts.

In October 2013 the government directed K-Con to supply performance and payment bonds before a notice to proceed could be issued.  K-Con initially refused but ultimately provided the bonds two years later.  The contracts were then adjusted to add the cost of the bonds.

K-Con submitted a claim under each contract for increases in costs for the two year delay, for a total value of $116,336.56.  The Contracting Officer denied the claim on the basis that the agreements were construction contracts, for which performance and payment bonds were mandatory pursuant to FAR 52.228-15, and that that provision was incorporated into the contracts pursuant to the Christian doctrine under which a court may insert a clause into a government contract by operation of law if that clause is required under applicable federal regulations.  G.L. Christian & Associates v. Unites States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963).  K-Con appealed to the Armed Services Board, which affirmed the denial of the claims.  K-Con then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Paulozzi v. Parkview Custom Homes, L.L.C., 2018 Ohio App. Lexis 4739 ( Nov. 1, 2018)  

 This case arose out of a dispute between homeowners and their contractor.  Dissatisfied with the work, the Paulozzis sued their contractor, Parkview Custom Homes, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud.  In response, Parkview moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration under the agreement’s arbitration provision.

The parties did not dispute that the contract required the Paulozzis to proceed through arbitration.  But the contract also specified that “the arbitration shall be conducted under the auspices of the Ohio Arbitration and Mediation Center in accordance with its rules, at Cleveland, Ohio.”  However, when the Paulozzis filed suit, the OAMC appeared to be defunct.

The Paulozzis argued that because the chosen forum no longer existed, the arbitration provision was unenforceable.  In response, Parkview maintained that the essential purpose of the arbitration provision was still capable of substantial accomplishment, and that the court should enforce it.  In the end, the trial court held that the original forum was defunct, and because the arbitration provision did not provide for an alternative forum, it was unenforceable under the doctrine of impossibility.  On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed.

Coalview Centralia, LLC v. Transalta Centralia Mining LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185914 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2018)

This case involves a dispute over Coalview Centralia, LLC’s (“Coalview”) performance of environmental cleanup work at a coal mine and associated power plant near Centralia, Washington.  TransAlta Central Mining (“TCM”) hired Coalview to remediate and restore three waste coal slurry impoundment ponds.  In general terms, Coalview agreed to dredge the ponds, extract the coal fines for use in the power plant, and deliver the remaining slurry for final disposal.  Coalview was to submit monthly invoices – and to be paid – based on the weight of slurry removed or the weight of usable coal recovered, whichever is greater.

The Master Services Agreement (“MSA”) between TCM and Coalview provided, in pertinent part, that: (1) TCM had 30 days to “dispute” an invoice and explain the reasons for its dispute; (2) the parties had a one-year period to correct invoice “inaccuracies”; and (3) “[n]otwithstanding any disputes … contractor and owner shall diligently proceed with performance of this Agreement.”

Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., 2018 Ohio LEXIS 2375 (Oct. 9, 2018)

This post was published in the National Association of Credit Management eNews on December 20, 2018.

This case arose out of the construction of an inn and conference center at Ohio Northern University (“ONU”).  After completion of the project, ONU discovered water damage and structural defects in the work and filed suit for breach of contract against its general contractor, Charles Construction Services, Inc. (“Charles”).  Charles, in turn, sought defense and indemnity from its commercial general liability insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”).  As required by ONU, Charles’s policy contained a “products-completed operations-hazard” (“PCOH”) clause and terms specifically related to work performed by subcontractors.  Under Charles’ policy, the insurance covered “property damage” only if it was caused by an “occurrence,” defined as “[a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”  “Accident,” however, was not defined.  CIC intervened in ONU’s suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to defend or indemnify Charles.

The trial court granted CIC summary judgment, holding that CIC had no duty to indemnify or defend Charles.  The trial court based its holding on Westfield Inc. Co. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 979 N.E.2d 269, a 2012 decision in which the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that claims for faulty workmanship are not fortuitous, and therefore, not claims for “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” covered by a CGL policy.

IES Commercial, Inc. v. Manhattan Torcon, A Joint Venture, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164973 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2018)

In 2009, the Army Corps of Engineers hired Manhattan Torcon Joint Venture (“MT”) as general contractor to build a biological research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  MT subcontracted with IES Commercial, Inc. (“IES”) to perform the electrical system work.

In August 2013, after IES had completed over 90% of its work, a fire destroyed or damaged more than half of the facility, including significant portions of IES’s work. MT ordered IES to perform significant fire remediation work in addition to the remainder of its base contract work. In November 2013, IES and MT entered into a subcontract amendment referred to as the “Fire Rider,” which included an agreed rate schedule for the fire remediation work, along with a procedure by which IES would perform work at MT’s direction, submit daily work tickets and monthly invoices, and be paid within ten days after MT received payment from its insurer.

Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. T

ravelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162265 (D. Nev., September 21, 2018)
Clark County School District (“CCSD”) hired Big Town Mechanical (“Big Town”) as general contractor to perform HVAC upgrades at five schools.  Big Town in turn hired F.A.S.T. Systems (“FAST”) to complete low-voltage work at the schools.  Big Town obtained performance bonds from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (“Travelers”) and FAST obtained performance bonds from Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland (“F&D”).

Following FAST’s default on its subcontracts, F&D opted to complete FAST’s work and hired a substitute subcontractor, Perini.  In May 2012, Perini notified Big Town that it had “substantially completed” all of FAST’s work.  After Big Town refused payment, F&D filed suit against Big Town and Travelers in early 2013.  In May of 2013, CCSD rejected Big Town’s final payment application, stating that the project was incomplete and claiming there were significant defects in the work.  CCSD then sued Travelers seeking specific performance and liquidated damages for delay.  Travelers eventually settled CCSD’s suit but through its counterclaim sought reimbursement from F&D for its settlement plus costs expended to complete the project.

Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 13019 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 12, 2018)

 A group of townhome owners (the “Homeowners”) sued the contractor and a subcontractor (collectively, “Contractor”) who built their townhomes, alleging that Contractor performed defective work.  Contractor had completed construction and conveyed the townhomes to the Homeowners on March 31, 2004.  The Homeowners did not discover the alleged defect until years later.  On February 6, 2014, nearly ten years after Contractor completed the work, the Homeowners notified Contractor of the claimed construction defect.  The Homeowners provided that notice in accordance with Florida’s construction defect statute (Fla. Stat. §§ 558.003; 558.004) that requires pre-suit notice of construction defect claims.  The Homeowners completed the statutory pre-suit procedure and filed their lawsuit on May 2, 2014, more than ten years after taking possession of the townhomes.

Contractor argued that Florida’s ten-year statute of repose barred the lawsuit.  While acknowledging that they filed their lawsuit beyond the ten-year period, the Homeowners stressed that the claims were timely because the action truly had commenced within the ten year period when they submitted the pre-suit notice of claim.  The trial court agreed with Contractor and entered summary judgment in its favor.  The Homeowners appealed.

Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24671 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2018)

On August 30, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision to compel arbitration between an Alabama steel plant owner and a French division of General Electric Co.  The case is noteworthy because the Court settled two questions of law within the Eleventh Circuit about the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”) and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The first question concerned the interpretation the FAA’s grant of removal jurisdiction to the federal courts.  The second concerned whether an entity could compel arbitration under the Convention despite the lack of a signed arbitration agreement.

Outokumpu Stainless, LLC (“OS”) operates a steel plant in Calver, Alabama that contains three cold rolling mills.  In 2007, OS entered into three separate agreements with an entity known as Fives for the purchase of the mills.  The Agreements each contained an arbitration clause which required all disputes be resolved via arbitration in Germany under the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC.  The Agreements also provided that Fives, and all of its subcontractors, would be treated as one and the same under the contracts.

Fives subcontracted with GE Energy (“GE”) to produce motors for the mills.  The motors were installed between 2011 and 2012.  By June 2014 they began to fail.

Bridgwood v A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 2018 Mass. Lexis 561 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 29, 2018)

On October 30, 2000, the city of Newburyport, through its housing rehabilitation program, awarded A.J. Wood a contract for the rehabilitation of Ms. Terry Bridgwood’s home in Newburyport.  Under the city’s contractor agreement for the housing program, Wood was required to comply with certain standards, including that all rehabilitation, alterations, repairs, or extensions be in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local codes.  The agreement also required that all contractors and subcontractors must obtain and maintain all necessary permits, and must certify that the work complied with all Federal, State, and local regulations of the Massachusetts home improvement law, among other things.  The work on the Bridgwood home was completed by Wood in 2001.

In 2012, Bridgwood’s home suffered a substantial fire.  She filed suit in the state superior court in 2016, under the Consumer Protection Statute, claiming that Wood and its electrical subcontractor failed to obtain a permit to replace or repair certain ceiling light fixtures on the premises.  Additionally, she alleged that none of the defendants gave proper notice to local inspectors, nor did they perform their work in compliance with the applicable Federal, State, or local codes, as required by the contractor agreement.
Wood moved to dismiss Bridgwood’s lawsuit as untimely under the statute of repose.  The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the suit.  Bridgwood appealed and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court.  A divided Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-3 decision.

Charlotte Student Hous. DST v. Choate Constr. Co., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 88 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2018).

This case arose from the construction of a student apartment complex known as Arcadia.  The plaintiffs, Arcadia’s current owner and landlord, asserted breach of warranty, negligence, and fraud claims against Arcadia’s original owner, the architect, the general contractor, and two subcontractors, alleging that defects in Arcadia’s design and construction caused millions of dollars in repairs and lost rent.

The general contractor, Choate Construction Company, and its geotechnical engineering subcontractor, Geoscience Group, moved to dismiss all claims asserted against them on the ground that they were subject to arbitration.  Choate and Geoscience pointed to arbitration clauses in their contracts with the original owner, both of which required all claims “arising out of or related to” those contracts to be arbitrated before the AAA in accordance with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules.

The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clauses were not binding on them because the contracts that contained them were not assigned to plaintiffs when they purchased Arcadia. They also argued that their tort claims were not subject to the arbitration clauses.