Construction Dispute

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Skyrise Construction Group, LLC v. Annex Construction, LLC, 2019 BL 55071 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20, 2019)

Subcontractor Skyrise Construction, Inc. (“Skyrise”) sued general contractor Annex Construction, Inc. (“Annex”) for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Wisconsin and Illinois trade practices statutes.  Skyrise primarily based its claims on an assertion that the parties entered into a subcontract, which Annex breached when it removed Skyrise from the project and completed the work with an alternative subcontractor.  Both Skyrise and Annex filed motions for summary judgment.  The District Court denied Skyrise’s motion and granted Annex’s motion.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners, 2019 BL 36988, 2 (Wash. App. Div. 2 Feb. 05, 2019)

On January 8, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington reversed and remanded in part a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a tunnel-boring construction case.  Specifically, the Court clarified that the three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims begins to run as soon as the aggrieved party becomes aware of the factual elements of the claims.  It does not matter whether the underlying cause of the claims remains disputed.

Ferrara v. Peaches Café LLC, 2018 NY Lexis 3244 (November 20, 2018)

COR Ridge Road Company, LLC (“COR”), as landlord, entered into a 10 year lease with Peaches Café, LLC (“Peaches”).  The lease imposed certain construction requirements on Peaches for it to operate its restaurant, including adherence to specific electrical specifications. The lease also provided that COR approve of any improvements to the premises, that Peaches submit to COR all design plans for the electrical work, and that any improvements made become part of the realty.  Angelo Ferrara (“Ferrara”) performed some of the electrical work.

After Peaches closed its business, Ferrara filed a mechanics lien against the property for more than $50,000 Peaches owed him, noticing both Peaches and COR. Ferrara subsequently sought to foreclose on the lien.  Both Ferrara and COR moved for summary judgment in the foreclosure action, and the trial court granted COR’s motion and dismissed the complaint against it. The Appellate Division granted Ferrara’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the validity of the lien on COR’s property. COR appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed.

Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 13019 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 12, 2018)

 A group of townhome owners (the “Homeowners”) sued the contractor and a subcontractor (collectively, “Contractor”) who built their townhomes, alleging that Contractor performed defective work.  Contractor had completed construction and conveyed the townhomes to the Homeowners on March 31, 2004.  The Homeowners did not discover the alleged defect until years later.  On February 6, 2014, nearly ten years after Contractor completed the work, the Homeowners notified Contractor of the claimed construction defect.  The Homeowners provided that notice in accordance with Florida’s construction defect statute (Fla. Stat. §§ 558.003; 558.004) that requires pre-suit notice of construction defect claims.  The Homeowners completed the statutory pre-suit procedure and filed their lawsuit on May 2, 2014, more than ten years after taking possession of the townhomes.

Contractor argued that Florida’s ten-year statute of repose barred the lawsuit.  While acknowledging that they filed their lawsuit beyond the ten-year period, the Homeowners stressed that the claims were timely because the action truly had commenced within the ten year period when they submitted the pre-suit notice of claim.  The trial court agreed with Contractor and entered summary judgment in its favor.  The Homeowners appealed.

Bridgwood v A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 2018 Mass. Lexis 561 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 29, 2018)

On October 30, 2000, the city of Newburyport, through its housing rehabilitation program, awarded A.J. Wood a contract for the rehabilitation of Ms. Terry Bridgwood’s home in Newburyport.  Under the city’s contractor agreement for the housing program, Wood was required to comply with certain standards, including that all rehabilitation, alterations, repairs, or extensions be in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local codes.  The agreement also required that all contractors and subcontractors must obtain and maintain all necessary permits, and must certify that the work complied with all Federal, State, and local regulations of the Massachusetts home improvement law, among other things.  The work on the Bridgwood home was completed by Wood in 2001.

In 2012, Bridgwood’s home suffered a substantial fire.  She filed suit in the state superior court in 2016, under the Consumer Protection Statute, claiming that Wood and its electrical subcontractor failed to obtain a permit to replace or repair certain ceiling light fixtures on the premises.  Additionally, she alleged that none of the defendants gave proper notice to local inspectors, nor did they perform their work in compliance with the applicable Federal, State, or local codes, as required by the contractor agreement.
Wood moved to dismiss Bridgwood’s lawsuit as untimely under the statute of repose.  The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the suit.  Bridgwood appealed and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court.  A divided Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-3 decision.

Fisk Elec. Co. v. DQSI, L.L.C., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17914 (5th Cir., June 29, 2018)

 DQSI, L.L.C., (“DQSI”) a general contractor, was hired by the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) for a pump station construction project.  Western Surety Company (“Western”) issued a Miller Act payment bond on DQSI’s behalf.  DQSI hired Fisk Electric Company (“Fisk”) as subcontractor to perform electrical work on the project.

The project was delayed 464 days due, in part, to adverse weather conditions.  Fisk asserted expenses due to the delay of over $400,000 against DQSI and submitted a Request for Equitable Adjustment (“REA”) to DQSI for the 464 days of delay.

Fisk sued DQSI and Western pursuant to the Miller Act.  The parties then entered into a settlement agreement wherein Fisk would release DQSI for payment of approximately $55,000 and for DQSI’s agreement that it would submit the REA to the Corps and pursue it. 

United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co., 2018 Cal. Lexis 3510 (May 14, 2018)

This post was published in the August 16, 2018 issue of eNews published by National Association of Credit Management (NACM).

In 2010, Universal City (“Universal”) hired Coast Iron & Steel Co. (“Coast Iron”) to build a new ride at the Universal Studios Hollywood.  Coast Iron subcontracted the installation of the metalwork to United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. (“United Riggers”).  The initial subcontract between Coast Iron and United Riggers was for $722,742 but was increased by change orders to approximately $1.5 million.  United Riggers completed its work to Coast Iron’s satisfaction.  In August 2012, Universal made its final retention payment to Coast Iron.  However, Coast Iron refused to pay any retention to United Riggers due to disputes over change order requests from United Riggers to increase the subcontract price by approximately $350,000.  United Riggers then filed suit to collect these sums, including prompt payment penalties under California Civil Code Section 8814 for failure to timely pay retention.  Coast Iron ultimately paid all of the $149,602.52 in retention owed to United Riggers during the litigation.  After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Coast Iron.  The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling on the statutory claim for failure to make timely retention payments.  The California Supreme Court affirmed.

Great N. Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. A16-0997, 2018 Minn. LEXIS 236 (May 9, 2018)

This case arises out of a residential construction project and the installation of ventilators into a home’s HVAC system.  Sixteen years after completion of the work, a fire occurred in one of the ventilators, causing property damage.  After paying the homeowners’ insurance claim, Great Northern Insurance (“Great Northern”), as subrogee, filed suit against McMillan Electric Company (“McMillan”), the manufacturer of the motors in the ventilators, asserting claims for product liability, breach of warranty, and negligence, including a claim for breach of a post-sale duty to warn consumers of the risk of fires in ventilator motors.

The trial court granted McMillan summary judgment concluding that Minnesota’s 10-year statute of repose barred all of Great Northern’s claims except for the post-sale duty to warn claim, which also failed because McMillan owed no such duty. The Court of Appeals reversed both holdings.  On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that McMillan’s motor was “machinery,” to which the statute of repose does not apply.

Woodrow Wilson Constr. LLC v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,  2018 La. App. LEXIS 762 (April 18, 2018)

The Orleans Parish School Board (“OPSB”) awarded a prime contract to Woodrow Wilson Construction (“WWC”) for the construction of a new elementary school (the “Project”).  On May 23, 2016, WWC submitted its request for payment of final retainage to OPSB.  OPSB withheld payment from WWC, claiming that WWC owed liquidated damages for the delays in completion of the Project, which allegedly exceeded the amount due to WWC.  WWC filed a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(D) (the “Act”), which provides that “[a]ny public entity failing to make any … any final payment when due as provided in this Section, shall be subject to mandamus to compel the payment of the sums due under the contract …”  The trial court denied the petition and WWC appealed.  The question on appeal was whether OPSB may withhold final payment due under the Act because of alleged delays in the Project, despite the fact that liability for the delays had not yet been adjudicated.

Section A of the Act provides that “[a]ll public entities shall promptly pay all obligations arising under public contracts when the obligations become due and payable under the contract.  All … final payments shall be paid when they respectively become due and payable under the contract.”  Under the prime contract, retainage was due upon the occurrence of six enumerated requirements.  The Court determined that these requirements were all satisfied as of May 23, 2016 and therefore final retainage was due to WWC as of that date.  The Court further found that upon satisfaction of these requirements, the public entity owed a ministerial duty to issue final payment.  By providing the right to mandamus relief in the Act, the legislature intended to eliminate the public entity’s discretion to withhold payment from a contractor.

Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Rodriguez & Quiroga Architects Chtd., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42652 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2018)

This case arises out of the design and construction of a science museum in Miami, Florida (the “Project”).  Museum of Science, Inc. (“MSI”), the Project owner, executed several agreements relating to the Project, including: (i) an agreement with Defendant Rodriguez and Quiroga Architects Chartered (“R&Q”) to serve as executive architect; (ii) an agreement with Defendant Grimshaw Architects P.C. (“Grimshaw”) to serve as the design architect; (iii) a construction services contract with Plaintiff Suffolk Construction Co. (“Suffolk”); and (iv) a direct contract with Suffolk’s subcontractor, Plaintiff Baker Concrete Construction, Inc. (“Baker”) for construction services after MSI terminated Suffolk for convenience.  After execution of these agreements, R&Q executed contracts with Defendant Fraga Engineers, LLC (“Fraga”) for mechanical, electrical, and plumbing design services, and with Defendant DDA Engineers, P.A. (“DDA”) for structural design and engineering services.

Suffolk and Baker (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit for negligence against R&Q, Grimshaw, Fraga, and DDA (collectively, “Defendants”), claiming that by issuing deficient design documents, Defendants breached their duties owed to Plaintiffs causing Plaintiffs to incur economic losses.  All Defendants but R&Q moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that they had no supervisory role or control over Plaintiffs, as demonstrated by the fact that their contracts with MSI did not designate them as “supervisory architects,” and thus, owed no duty to Plaintiffs.