Wyman v. Ayer Properties, LLC, 469 Mass. 64,  2014 Mass. LEXIS 524 (July 10, 2014)

The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the economic loss rule, which bars recovery of tort damages from the negligent supplier of a defective product when there is no claim of personal injury or damage to other property, does not apply to claims asserted by a condominium association or similar condominium organization seeking compensation for damage to common areas of a condominium building caused by defective construction.

This case arises out of a dispute between the Market Gallery Condominium Trust, the trustees responsible for management of a condo building, and Ayer Properties, the developer and builder of the condo building, after the trustees observed that Ayer had negligently constructed the window frames, the exterior brick masonry, and the roof of the building. The trustees commenced an action alleging that the negligent construction caused damage to both the common areas and the residential units in the building.

C&H Electric, Inc. v. Town of Bethel, 312 Conn. 843, 2014 Conn. LEXIS 263 (Aug. 5, 2014)

This dispute arose out of a project to renovate and build an addition at a high school in the Town of Bethel, Connecticut.  The plaintiff, C&H Electric, entered into a contract with the defendant, the Town of Bethel, to perform the electrical work on the project.  The parties’ contract included a “no damages for delay” clause, limiting the defendant’s liability for delays it caused on the project.  The no damages for delay clause specified that an extension of time would be plaintiff’s “sole remedy” for “(1) delays in the commencement, prosecution or completion of the work, (2) hindrance or obstruction in the performance of the work, (3) loss of productivity, or (4) other similar claims whether or not such delays are foreseeable, contemplated, or uncontemplated . . .”  The contract included a single exception to the no damages for delay clause, which allowed the plaintiff to recover for delays caused by acts of the defendant “constituting active interference with [the plaintiff’s] performance of the work.”  While the contract did not define “active interference,” it did specify that the defendant’s exercise of its contractual rights, including its right to suspend, reschedule or change the work, would not constitute “active interference.”

American Towers LLC v. BPI, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106724 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2014)

American Towers LLC (“American Towers”), which operates wireless and broadcast communications towers, undertook a project to construct a cell tower in Prestonburg, KY, along with a tower compound and access road.  American Towers selected BPI, Inc. (“BPI”) as general contractor for the project, and the parties executed a contract.

The contract contained a number of provisions that allocated the parties’ responsibilities with respect to design and construction.  In particular, the contract provided that American Towers was to provide BPI with drawings, specifications, and instructions.  BPI, for its part, was responsible for “all construction means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures[.]”  Moreover, BPI was to complete its work in a “workmanlike manner and with the highest degree of skill and care exercised by reputable contractors performing the same or similar services[.]” In performing its work, if BPI recognized any problems with American Towers’ design, the contract provided that BPI was to stop work and inform American Towers of the problem.  American Towers would then “issue written instructions” to BPI about how BPI should proceed.

Shafer Elec. & Constr. v. Mantia, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 1766 (Pa. July 21, 2014)

Homeowners Raymond and Donna Mantia contracted Shafer Electric & Construction (“Shafer”) to build a two-car garage addition onto their house. Shafer’s proposal was extremely detailed as to the work to be completed. Despite the detail in Shafer’s specifications, however, Shafer’s proposals did not comply with several requirements of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act, 73 P.S. §§ 517.1-517.18 (the “Act”). Specifically, pursuant to the Act, any home improvement contract must be legible, in writing, and satisfy thirteen other requirements. § 517.7(a). The contract satisfied only three of those requirements.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies, work began on the addition. During the subsequent months, a dispute arose concerning changes the Mantias made to the design of the addition. Other alterations became necessary as a result of excavation problems that arose during the work. The parties could not agree on a new contract, which Shafer believed was required due to the design changes. The parties agreed that Shafer would stop work and invoice the Mantias for the work it completed. When Shafer issued the final invoice, the Mantias refused to pay.

Bedwell Co. v. Camden County Improvement Auth., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95510 (D.N.J. July 14, 2014)

The University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey contracted HDR Architects and Engineers, P.C. (“HDR”) to design a medical school building. After the project went to bid, the Bedwell Company (“Bedwell”) contracted with the owner’s development and contracting agent for the performance of foundation, structural steel, and other construction work.

Bedwell and HDR did not have a contract with each other. According to the allegations in Bedwell’s complaint, however, HDR was aware that the design documents that it prepared under its contract with the owner would be used by contractors like Bedwell in their estimation of costs and time for completion of the work. In its complaint, Bedwell alleged that defects in HDR’s design documents—which led to 212 Requests for Information and 469 Change Order Requests—caused unexpected costs and numerous delays.

Laquila Grp., Inc. v. Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc., 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 25, 2014)

This action arose out of a payment dispute following construction of the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York.  General contractor Hunt Construction Group, Inc. (“Hunt”) retained Laquila Group, Inc. (“Laquila) as a subcontractor to perform excavation and foundation work for the project.  The parties executed a subcontract whereby Laquila would perform the work for $27.5 million with the understanding that the work had to be completed in a timely manner due to events at Barclays already scheduled around the completion date.  The subcontract further specified that Hunt was not liable to Laquila for any additional costs or changes in the work absent a written change order.

The project experienced various complications, which resulted in the parties entering into numerous change orders.  Hunt paid Laquila the money due under the original $27.5 million subcontract, plus payments covering the change orders.  Each change order executed by Laquila contained the clause, “[a]cceptance of this Change Order constitutes a waiver of any claim, additional compensation and time whatsoever in relationship to the items covered under this Change Order.”  Moreover, with each progress payment, Laquila submitted releases and a “Partial Waiver of Claims” including a waiver of liens that confirmed that it had been properly paid for its work.

KNL Construction, Inc. v. Killian Construction Co., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58269 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2014)

This action arose out of the construction of the Mohegan Sun Hotel in Luzerene County, Pennsylvania.  General contractor Killian Construction Co., Inc. (“Killian”) retained KNL Construction, Inc. (“KNL”) as a subcontractor to perform certain work on the project.  The parties executed a subcontract which contained a forum selection clause mandating that disputes thereunder be litigated in Greene County Missouri, or if federal jurisdiction is applicable, in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
A dispute arose over KNL’s performance under the subcontract, eventually leading to its termination.  In response, KNL brought suit in Pennsylvania state court for breach of contract and related claims premised on payments allegedly owed by Killian, including a claim under Pennsylvania’s Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“CASPA”).  Killian removed the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds and filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, or, in the alternative, transfer for forum non conveniens.  In support of its motion, Killian argued that the clear language of the forum selection clause designates Missouri as the exclusive venue for litigation.

United States ex rel JEMS Fabrication, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 8175 (5th Cir., April 30, 2014)

This dispute arises out of a construction project to renovate and redevelop pumping stations located at various sites along the Mississippi River.  The U.S. Corp of Engineers entered into a contract with Benetech, LLC for the project.  Benetech then entered into a subcontract with plaintiff JEMS, whereby JEMS agreed to supply custom-fabricated structural steel for use on the project.  The contract amount, including approved change orders, was $2.38 million and required JEMS to provide shop drawings, materials and on-site labor.

JEMS delivered all of the shop drawings and most of the materials required by the subcontract.  However, JEMS did not supply most of the on-site labor, as Benetech and JEMS agreed that Benetech would supply the labor to satisfy its self-performance obligations in its contract with the Corp of Engineers.  JEMS and Benetech also agreed to a subcontract modification such that Benetech would purchase a custom building directly from JEMS’ subcontractor for $54,000.  However, because of changes made by the Corp of Engineers, which were not incorporated into the subcontract, Benetech’s cost for the custom building was $147,000.  Ultimately, Benetech paid JEMS just under $1 million for its work on the project and alleged that JEMS was not entitled to any additional payment.  Benetech claimed that it was entitled to a set-off against any amount due under the subcontract because it had to purchase materials that JEMS should have supplied for the project.

United States ex rel. Heggem-Lundquist Paint Co. v. Centerre Gov’t Contracting Grp., LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66161 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2014) 
 Am. Constr. & Envtl. Servs. v. Total Team Constr. Servs., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57467 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014)

Federal district courts for the District of Colorado and the Eastern District of California have ruled  subcontract provisions that disputes will be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution provisions in a prime contract are insufficient to waive or postpone a subcontractor’s Miller Act rights.

These cases involved claims asserted by subcontractors (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against the upstream contractors and their sureties (collectively “Defendants”) for work performed on federal government projects.  The plaintiff in Haggem-Lundquist performed as a sub-subcontractor on a Department of Veterans Affairs renovation project at a medical center in Denver, Colorado.  The plaintiff in Am. Constr. & Envtl. Servs. performed as a subcontractor in support of a contract with the Army Corps of Engineers to replace emergency generators at a Veterans Administration Care Facility in Fresno, California.  In both actions, Plaintiffs filed claims against the bonds issued for the projects pursuant to the Miller Act to recover money allegedly owed for changed and additional work performed.

Technica LLC v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 749 F.3d 1149,2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8023 (9th Cir., April, 29, 2014)

This payment dispute arose out of the ICE El Centro SPC – Perimeter Fence Replacement/Internal Devising Fence Replacement federal project in California.  Candelaria was the prime contractor.  Candelaria entered into subcontract with Otay, who contracted with Technica to act as a sub-subcontractor.  After submitting invoices for labor, material and services, Technica received only partial payment for its work.

Technica filed a Miller Act claim authorized by federal statute  to recover the outstanding amount owed on its sub-subcontract against Candelaria’s payment bond.  Candelaria and its surety filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the California Business and Professions Code precludes any contractor from maintaining a collection action, unless the contractor was licensed during the performance of the contract.  Since Technica lacked a California contactor license, the district court held that Technica could not pursue a Miller Act claim.