Laquila Grp., Inc. v. Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc., 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 25, 2014)

This action arose out of a payment dispute following construction of the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York.  General contractor Hunt Construction Group, Inc. (“Hunt”) retained Laquila Group, Inc. (“Laquila) as a subcontractor to perform excavation and foundation work for the project.  The parties executed a subcontract whereby Laquila would perform the work for $27.5 million with the understanding that the work had to be completed in a timely manner due to events at Barclays already scheduled around the completion date.  The subcontract further specified that Hunt was not liable to Laquila for any additional costs or changes in the work absent a written change order.

The project experienced various complications, which resulted in the parties entering into numerous change orders.  Hunt paid Laquila the money due under the original $27.5 million subcontract, plus payments covering the change orders.  Each change order executed by Laquila contained the clause, “[a]cceptance of this Change Order constitutes a waiver of any claim, additional compensation and time whatsoever in relationship to the items covered under this Change Order.”  Moreover, with each progress payment, Laquila submitted releases and a “Partial Waiver of Claims” including a waiver of liens that confirmed that it had been properly paid for its work.

KNL Construction, Inc. v. Killian Construction Co., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58269 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2014)

This action arose out of the construction of the Mohegan Sun Hotel in Luzerene County, Pennsylvania.  General contractor Killian Construction Co., Inc. (“Killian”) retained KNL Construction, Inc. (“KNL”) as a subcontractor to perform certain work on the project.  The parties executed a subcontract which contained a forum selection clause mandating that disputes thereunder be litigated in Greene County Missouri, or if federal jurisdiction is applicable, in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
A dispute arose over KNL’s performance under the subcontract, eventually leading to its termination.  In response, KNL brought suit in Pennsylvania state court for breach of contract and related claims premised on payments allegedly owed by Killian, including a claim under Pennsylvania’s Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“CASPA”).  Killian removed the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds and filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, or, in the alternative, transfer for forum non conveniens.  In support of its motion, Killian argued that the clear language of the forum selection clause designates Missouri as the exclusive venue for litigation.

United States ex rel JEMS Fabrication, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 8175 (5th Cir., April 30, 2014)

This dispute arises out of a construction project to renovate and redevelop pumping stations located at various sites along the Mississippi River.  The U.S. Corp of Engineers entered into a contract with Benetech, LLC for the project.  Benetech then entered into a subcontract with plaintiff JEMS, whereby JEMS agreed to supply custom-fabricated structural steel for use on the project.  The contract amount, including approved change orders, was $2.38 million and required JEMS to provide shop drawings, materials and on-site labor.

JEMS delivered all of the shop drawings and most of the materials required by the subcontract.  However, JEMS did not supply most of the on-site labor, as Benetech and JEMS agreed that Benetech would supply the labor to satisfy its self-performance obligations in its contract with the Corp of Engineers.  JEMS and Benetech also agreed to a subcontract modification such that Benetech would purchase a custom building directly from JEMS’ subcontractor for $54,000.  However, because of changes made by the Corp of Engineers, which were not incorporated into the subcontract, Benetech’s cost for the custom building was $147,000.  Ultimately, Benetech paid JEMS just under $1 million for its work on the project and alleged that JEMS was not entitled to any additional payment.  Benetech claimed that it was entitled to a set-off against any amount due under the subcontract because it had to purchase materials that JEMS should have supplied for the project.

United States ex rel. Heggem-Lundquist Paint Co. v. Centerre Gov’t Contracting Grp., LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66161 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2014) 
 Am. Constr. & Envtl. Servs. v. Total Team Constr. Servs., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57467 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014)

Federal district courts for the District of Colorado and the Eastern District of California have ruled  subcontract provisions that disputes will be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution provisions in a prime contract are insufficient to waive or postpone a subcontractor’s Miller Act rights.

These cases involved claims asserted by subcontractors (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against the upstream contractors and their sureties (collectively “Defendants”) for work performed on federal government projects.  The plaintiff in Haggem-Lundquist performed as a sub-subcontractor on a Department of Veterans Affairs renovation project at a medical center in Denver, Colorado.  The plaintiff in Am. Constr. & Envtl. Servs. performed as a subcontractor in support of a contract with the Army Corps of Engineers to replace emergency generators at a Veterans Administration Care Facility in Fresno, California.  In both actions, Plaintiffs filed claims against the bonds issued for the projects pursuant to the Miller Act to recover money allegedly owed for changed and additional work performed.

Technica LLC v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 749 F.3d 1149,2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8023 (9th Cir., April, 29, 2014)

This payment dispute arose out of the ICE El Centro SPC – Perimeter Fence Replacement/Internal Devising Fence Replacement federal project in California.  Candelaria was the prime contractor.  Candelaria entered into subcontract with Otay, who contracted with Technica to act as a sub-subcontractor.  After submitting invoices for labor, material and services, Technica received only partial payment for its work.

Technica filed a Miller Act claim authorized by federal statute  to recover the outstanding amount owed on its sub-subcontract against Candelaria’s payment bond.  Candelaria and its surety filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the California Business and Professions Code precludes any contractor from maintaining a collection action, unless the contractor was licensed during the performance of the contract.  Since Technica lacked a California contactor license, the district court held that Technica could not pursue a Miller Act claim.

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege applies to internal investigations performed at the direction of in-house counsel if “one of the significant purposes” of the investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice.

Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”) was a defense contractor for the United States government. Harry Barko, a former employee of KBR, filed a False Claims Act complaint against KBR, alleging fraud against the government. During the ensuing litigation, Barko requested documents related to KBR’s prior internal investigation into the alleged fraud. The investigation had been conducted by KBR pursuant to Department of Defense regulations that require defense contractors to maintain compliance programs and conduct internal investigations, and was overseen by the company’s in-house legal department. KBR objected to the document request, arguing that the investigation was protected by the attorney-client privilege. In turn, Barko argued that the documents were discoverable business records not covered by the privilege.

VSI Sales, LLC v. Griffin Sign, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57620 (D. Del. Apr. 25, 2014)

The Delaware Department of Transportation awarded a contract for a highway construction project. Defendant Griffin Sign, Inc. (“Griffin”) was hired as the subcontractor responsible for installation of road signage on the project. Griffin then subcontracted with Plaintiff VSI Sales, LLC (“VSI”) for the supply of overhead highway sign structures, accompanying hardware, and installation materials.

A dispute arose regarding VSI’s right to payment for work performed on the project. Griffin disputed that it owed VSI payment and contended that VSI’s performance was untimely and deficient. In its seven count complaint against Griffin and its payment bond surety, VSI asserted a claim for violation of the Delaware Construction Prompt Payment Act, Del. C. §§ 3501-3509. The defendants sought to dismiss the Payment Act claim on the basis that the work performed by Griffin and VSI—the supply and installation of highway signs—was outside the scope of the Act.

Boone Coleman Construction, Inc. v. Village of Piketon, 2014-Ohio-2377, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 2317 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 2014)

The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that a liquidated damages provision in a public construction contract constituted an unenforceable penalty because the amount of liquidated damages sought – nearly one-third of the total contract price – was “so manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate” to the contract price that it was unenforceable.

The defendant in that case was the Village of Piketon, Ohio, which solicited bids for a public construction project for roadway improvements. Plaintiff, Boone Coleman Construction, Inc., was the low bidder on the project. The parties entered into a contract under which Boone Coleman agreed to construct the project for $683,300. The contract further provided that if Boone Coleman had not substantially completed its work within 120 days, it would pay the Village $700 per day in liquidated damages until the project was substantially completed. Ultimately, Boone Coleman did not complete its work until 397 days after the agreed project completion date. Upon completion, the Village paid Boone Coleman $535,823 for its work.

BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (Mar. 5, 2014) 

This action arose from an investment by British company BG Group PLC (“BG”) in Argentina and under the protection of a treaty between the United Kingdom and Argentina.  The treaty included a provision that required an aggrieved investor to submit their dispute to a local court in the country where the investment was made for a period of eighteen months prior to pursuing arbitration.   BG invoked the treaty for Argentina’s alleged breach of a natural gas distribution contract.  However, prior to exhausting the treaty’s local litigation requirement, BG proceeded to arbitration in Washington D.C.

Argentina argued that the arbitral panel lacked jurisdiction because BG had not complied with the local litigation requirement. The arbitral panel concluded that it had jurisdiction, finding, among other things, that Argentina’s conduct (such as enacting new laws that hindered recourse to its judiciary by investors in BG’s situation) had excused BG’s failure to comply with the local litigation requirement.  The matter proceeded through arbitration where BG was awarded $185 million in damages.

Argentina turned to American courts to overturn the award, again advancing the argument that the arbitral panel lacked jurisdiction.  The district court initially confirmed the award, but on appeal to the Circuit Court it was vacated.  The Circuit Court held that the gateway issue of arbitrability at hand—whether BG was required to commence litigation before the local courts and wait eighteen months before it could commence arbitration—was for a court, and not the arbitral panel, to decide.

Bd. of Comm’rs v. Teton Corp., 3 N.E.3d 556, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

This action arose out of a repair and renovation project to the Jefferson County Courthouse in Madison, Indiana (the “Project”). The Jefferson County Board of Commissioners (the “Owner”) contracted with Teton Corporation (the “Contractor”) for the work. The parties’ agreement incorporated a form construction contract prepared by the American Institute of Architects (the “AIA Contract”). The AIA Contract required the Owner to provide builder’s risk insurance for the Project, or to notify the Contractor so that the Contractor could procure the insurance and pass the cost on to the Owner through a change order. The AIA Contract also provided for a mutual waiver of the right to subrogation between and among the Owner, Contractor, and all subcontractors. The Owner did not obtain separate property (or builder’s risk) insurance for the Project, instead relying on its existing property and casualty insurance policy. And, the Owner also did not inform the Contractor that it was not securing separate insurance for the Project.

During the renovations, a fire broke out, causing over $6 million in damage to the property, including damage beyond the scope of the Contractor’s “Work” as defined in the AIA Contract. After the Owner’s insurance company paid under the terms of its policy, the Owner sued the Contractor and its subcontractors for the damages. The Contractor moved for summary judgment. The Contractor argued that the Owner agreed to provide insurance for the Project, and the Owner waived its subrogation rights against the Contractor; therefore, the Owner was not entitled to recover damages from the Contractor that were caused by the fire. The trial court agreed with the Contractor and granted summary judgment. The Owner appealed.