arbitration clause

Subscribe to arbitration clause via RSS

SMJ Gen. Constr., Inc. v. Jet Commer. Constr., LLC, No. S-16785/16985, 2019 BL 131640 (Alaska Apr. 12, 2019)

In 2016, Jet Commercial Construction, LLC (“Jet”) entered into a subcontract with SMJ General Construction, Inc. (“SMJ”) to supply materials and labor for the construction of a restaurant in Hawaii.  The subcontract contained a dispute resolution provision that required the parties to first mediate any dispute and then submit it to arbitration if mediation was unsuccessful.  It also included a choice-of-law and venue provision designating Oklahoma Law and the courts of Cleveland County, Oklahoma for any lawsuits pertaining to the Agreement’s enforcement.

SWN Prod. Co., LLC v. Long, 2017 W. Va. LEXIS 892 (W. Va. Oct. 18, 2017)

Respondents Richard and Mary Long (“Respondents” or “Lessors”) brought a state court action against Petitioner SWN Production Company, LLC (“Petitioner” or “Lessee”) seeking to recover alleged payments owed pursuant to an oil and gas lease (the “Lease”) entered into between Petitioner and Respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration, relying on the Lease’s arbitration provision, which reads:  “In the event of a disagreement between Lessor and Lessee concerning this Lease, performance thereunder, or damages caused by Lessee’s operations, the resolution of all such disputes shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.”

Dlorah, Inc. v. KLE Constr., LLC, No. CIV. 16-5102-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11043 (D.S.D. July 17, 2017)

Plaintiff, Dlorah, Inc. (“Dlorah”), filed suit against defendant, KLE Construction, LLC (“KLE”), in connection with an agreement for KLE to perform construction services at an apartment complex in Rapid City, South Dakota.  According to Dlorah, KLE’s actions while carrying out the construction breached the agreement and constituted fraud/deceit.

KLE moved the court to compel arbitration or alternatively stay the proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the parties’ agreement.  Dlorah objected to KLE’s motion on three grounds: (i) defendant had not satisfied the conditions precedent to compel arbitration; (ii) the dispute at issue did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause; and (iii) the arbitration clause was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore permitted Dlorah to file suit in court.  After concluding that the parties had in fact entered into a binding arbitration agreement, the court considered and rejected each of Dlorah’s arguments.

Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs, Inc.,
86 F.3d 656, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 13399 (7th Cir. June 5, 1996)
District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Indian tribe on grounds of tribe’s sovereign immunity; by signing contract with explicit arbitration clause, tribe agreed that it could be sued.