Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc., 2017 Cal. LEXIS 1024 (Cal. February 16, 2017)

This tort lawsuit relates to a dispute over the bidding process on several public works contracts in California. Between 2009 and 2012, American Asphalt outbid Roy Allan Slurry Seal and Doug Martin Contracting on 23 public works contracts for the application of slurry seal to roadways in five California counties.

Allan and Martin suspected that American illegally underbid them, and they sued American for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. They alleged that American illegally under-paid its employees to ensure that it won the bid as the lowest “responsible” bidder.  Allan and Martin alleged that but for American’s illegal conduct, they would have been awarded the contracts because they were the second lowest bidders.

The trial court dismissed Allan and Martin’s complaint holding that it failed to state a viable claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The appellate court reversed the trial court, but American appealed to the Supreme Court of California.

Lend Lease (US) Constr. LMB Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 11, 2017 N.Y. LEXIS 112 (N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017)

Early, in its opinion, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “[o]ne of the most dramatic images of [Superstorm Sandy] depicts the damage caused to [a] crane [being used on the construction of a 74-story skyscraper] when the boom of the crane collapsed in high winds and teetered precariously from a height equal to the top of the building.” At the time of the incident, Extell, the owner of the project, was the named insured on a $700 million builder’s risk insurance program comprised of five separate insurance policies.  Lend Lease, the contractor, was an additional insured on the policies.

Following the incident, Extell and Lend Lease submitted a claim to the insurers seeking to recover the damages incurred by Extell and Lend Lease resulting from weather-related harm to the crane. The insurers denied the claim and disclaimed that there was coverage under the policies.  This action ensued.  Both parties filed motions seeking summary judgment on the coverage issue.  The trial court denied the motions, ruling that there was an issue of fact regarding the applicability of certain exclusions in the policies.  On appeal, the Appellate Division granted the insurers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no coverage because the crane did not fall within the policies’ definition of “temporary works.”  This appeal followed.

Resolving the appeal required the Court of Appeals to answer two questions. First, was the damage to the crane covered under the policies in the first instance.  Second, if there was coverage, was it defeated by the policies’ contractor’s tools exclusion.  As explained below, the court concluded that although there may have been coverage in the first instance, the coverage was defeated by the exclusion.

United States v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., No. 16-0472-WS-C, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16791 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2017)

This action arose out of a payment dispute between Bay South Limited, Inc. (“Bay South”) and Stephens Construction & Concrete, Inc. (“Stephens”). Bay South entered into two subcontracts with Stephens, whereby Bay South agreed to furnish labor and materials to Stephens on two federal construction projects.  In connection therewith, International Fidelity Insurance Company (“Fidelity”) issued payment bonds (the “Bonds”) to Stephens.  Bay South filed a complaint in federal court to assert claims against the Bonds under the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. §3133), as well as other claims.  Stephens sought to compel arbitration of Bay South’s claims, pursuant to the arbitration provision in the subcontracts, which provided:

“In the event of a dispute arising between [Stephens] and [Bay South] under the Subcontract Agreement, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect …”

Bay South argued that the 1999 Amendment to the Miller Act prohibits such claims from being arbitrated, and, in the alternative, even if these claims may be arbitrated generally, Bay South’s specific claims are not subject to arbitration because they are not within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.

Hill County High School District No. A v. Dick Anderson Construction, Inc., 2017 Mont. LEXIS 38 (Mt. Feb 7, 2017)

This action arose out of the design and construction of a new roof for a high school in Hill County, Montana. The roof was built by Dick Anderson Construction, Inc. (“Contractor”) and designed by Springer Group Architects, P.C. (“Architect”). While the parties disputed whether the roof was ever completed to the School District’s satisfaction, the school was in full use by April 1998 and final payment was issued around that same time.

Problems emerged with the roof almost immediately. The Contractor and Architect worked with the School District to address the problems through October 2003 when the Architect informed the School District that repairs were finished and that no further work was necessary. But the roof partially collapsed in 2010 and the School District filed suit the following year.

Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. Jan. 23, 2017)

Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the “Flynns”) contracted with Nappa Construction Management, LLC (“Nappa”) to construct an automobile repair facility. The parties executed the American Institute of Architects’ A101-2007 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor.  The contract provided that the owner could terminate the contract for cause; could order the contractor to suspend the work without cause “for such period of time as the Owner may determine”; and could terminate the contract for convenience.

Six months after Nappa commenced work, the Flynns directed Nappa to “immediately cease any further work on the project,” contending that Nappa was not constructing the flooring according to the project plans or industry standards. Thereafter, Nappa submitted a payment application that included expenses for the disputed flooring, which the Flynns declined to pay.  Nappa notified the Flynns that they were in breach of the contract and filed for mediation.  Nappa ultimately terminated the contract for nonpayment.

Bell Prods. v. Hosp. Bldg. & Equip. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9183 (ND of Cal. Jan. 23, 2017)

A Contractor, Hospital Building and Equipment Company (“HBE”) entered into a subcontract with a mechanical subcontractor, Bell Products, Inc. (“Bell”), on a design-build project for a California hospital.  Bell sued HBE, asserting that HBE’s plans and specifications were deficient and failed to meet requirements of the applicable regulatory agencies, resulting in 15 months of delay to the project.  Bell initially sued HBE in State Court.  However, the case was removed to federal court, and the federal court stayed the proceedings pending conclusion of arbitration.

The subcontract provided that:  all claims between HBE and Bell shall be decided by arbitration; the arbitration shall be per the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association; the arbitration provisions shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and “unless [HBE] requests the locale to be the place of the Project, the arbitration locale shall be St. Louis, Missouri.  Bell sought relief from the venue provision, based upon a California Statute, C.C.P. § 410.42(a)(1), which provides:

(a) The following provisions of a contract between the contractor and a subcontractor with principal offices in this state, for the construction of a public or private work of improvement in this state, shall be void and unenforceable:
(1) A provision which purports to require any dispute between the parties to be litigated, arbitrated, or otherwise determined outside this state.

United States ex rel. J.A. Manning Constr. Co. v. Bronze Oak, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6054 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017)

 In May 2014 the Cherokee Nation issued a bid notice for bridge and roadway construction in Mayes County, Oklahoma (the “Project”). Funding was authorized pursuant to the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of the Interior’s Tribal Transportation Program, 23 U.S.C. § 202, by which federal funding is offered to Native American tribal governments to pay the costs of certain transportation projects located on, or providing access to, tribal lands.

Bronze Oak, LLC submitted a bid proposal and was hired as the general contractor for Project, and J.A. Manning Construction Company (“JAMCC”) was hired as a subcontractor to supply labor and materials to the Project. Bronze Oak’s bid proposal provided that any resulting contract would be construed under U.S. and Cherokee Nation laws.  A payment bond was issued for the Project naming Bronze Oak as the principal, Mid-Continental Casualty Company as surety, and the United States as obligee.  The payment bond also stated it was for the protection of persons supplying labor and materials pursuant to the Miller Act.

Tri-State Elec., Inc. ex rel. Apex Enters. v. Western Sur. Co., 1:14-CV-00245, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4974 (D. Idaho Jan. 11, 2017)

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) contracted with Sygnos, Inc. (“Sygnos”) for improvements to the electrical system at a VA hospital in Boise, Idaho. Sygnos subcontracted a portion of the work to Apex Enterprises, Inc. (“AEI”), who in turn subcontracted a portion of its work to Tri-State Electric, Inc. (“Tri-State”).  Delays plagued the project from the outset, and the work – originally scheduled for completion in 240 days – ultimately took more than 950 days to perform.  Disputes concerning responsibility for and the amount of delay damages ensued.

Sygnos submitted a request for equitable adjustment to the VA as a result of the delays. Receiving no timely response from the VA, Sygnos converted the request for equitable adjustment to a claim for delay damages under the Contract Disputes Act, which the VA and Sygnos settled for $645,000.  AEI and Tri-State subsequently sued Sygnos for delay damages they incurred on the project.  Sygnos did not dispute that AEI and Tri-State had suffered delays but it disputed some categories of damages claimed and cited the no-damage-for-delay clause in Tri-State’s contract as barring its claims.

D.W. Wilburn, Inc. v. K. Norman Berry Assocs., No. 2015-CA-001254-MR, 2016 Ky. App. Lexis 206 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016)

This case arose out of a construction project in which the Oldham County Board of Education (the “Board”) was the owner, K. Norman Berry Associates (“KNBA”) was the architect and D.W. Wilburn (“Wilburn”) was the general contractor. The Board’s contract with Wilburn provided that: (i) change orders must be signed by the architect, contractor, and owner; (ii) claims for additional time, money or delay damages must be submitted within twenty-one days of the event giving rise to the claim; (iii) change orders resolved all claims for time and money relating to the scope of the change order, and (iv) the contractor’s acceptance of final payment waived its claims, except those identified in writing as unsettled at the time of final application for payment.  Pursuant to the contract, the parties executed twenty-one change orders and Wilburn submitted a final payment application and closeout form.

Later, Wilburn was sued by one of its subcontractors for delay to the project. Wilburn then sued KNBA in a third party complaint asserting that KNBA was liable for the delay as a result of its defective plans and specifications.  The trial court granted KNBA summary judgment, dismissing Wilburn’s claim for lack of contractual privity.  Wilburn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

Port of Houston Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Zachry Constr. Corp., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13306 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Dec. 15, 2016)

This contract dispute dates back to 2004, when the Port of Houston Authority contracted with Zachry Construction to build a shipping wharf in Harris County, Texas. Zachry’s bid proposed, as part of its means and methods, building the wharf “in the dry” by using a frozen earthen wall to seal out water from the construction area. Several months into the project the Port Authority decided to extend the wharf. Zachry again proposed freeze-wall technology for the extension, and the parties entered into a change order.
The Port Authority then refused to approve Zachry’s frozen wall design, and directed Zachry to either present an alternative design or alternate means of mitigating risk. Unable to identify a viable alternative design, Zachry switched from the frozen wall design and completed the construction “in the wet.”