United States v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., No. 16-0472-WS-C, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16791 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2017)

This action arose out of a payment dispute between Bay South Limited, Inc. (“Bay South”) and Stephens Construction & Concrete, Inc. (“Stephens”). Bay South entered into two subcontracts with Stephens, whereby Bay South agreed to furnish labor and materials to Stephens on two federal construction projects.  In connection therewith, International Fidelity Insurance Company (“Fidelity”) issued payment bonds (the “Bonds”) to Stephens.  Bay South filed a complaint in federal court to assert claims against the Bonds under the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. §3133), as well as other claims.  Stephens sought to compel arbitration of Bay South’s claims, pursuant to the arbitration provision in the subcontracts, which provided:

“In the event of a dispute arising between [Stephens] and [Bay South] under the Subcontract Agreement, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect …”

Bay South argued that the 1999 Amendment to the Miller Act prohibits such claims from being arbitrated, and, in the alternative, even if these claims may be arbitrated generally, Bay South’s specific claims are not subject to arbitration because they are not within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.

Hill County High School District No. A v. Dick Anderson Construction, Inc., 2017 Mont. LEXIS 38 (Mt. Feb 7, 2017)

This action arose out of the design and construction of a new roof for a high school in Hill County, Montana. The roof was built by Dick Anderson Construction, Inc. (“Contractor”) and designed by Springer Group Architects, P.C. (“Architect”). While the parties disputed whether the roof was ever completed to the School District’s satisfaction, the school was in full use by April 1998 and final payment was issued around that same time.

Problems emerged with the roof almost immediately. The Contractor and Architect worked with the School District to address the problems through October 2003 when the Architect informed the School District that repairs were finished and that no further work was necessary. But the roof partially collapsed in 2010 and the School District filed suit the following year.

Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. Jan. 23, 2017)

Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the “Flynns”) contracted with Nappa Construction Management, LLC (“Nappa”) to construct an automobile repair facility. The parties executed the American Institute of Architects’ A101-2007 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor.  The contract provided that the owner could terminate the contract for cause; could order the contractor to suspend the work without cause “for such period of time as the Owner may determine”; and could terminate the contract for convenience.

Six months after Nappa commenced work, the Flynns directed Nappa to “immediately cease any further work on the project,” contending that Nappa was not constructing the flooring according to the project plans or industry standards. Thereafter, Nappa submitted a payment application that included expenses for the disputed flooring, which the Flynns declined to pay.  Nappa notified the Flynns that they were in breach of the contract and filed for mediation.  Nappa ultimately terminated the contract for nonpayment.

Bell Prods. v. Hosp. Bldg. & Equip. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9183 (ND of Cal. Jan. 23, 2017)

A Contractor, Hospital Building and Equipment Company (“HBE”) entered into a subcontract with a mechanical subcontractor, Bell Products, Inc. (“Bell”), on a design-build project for a California hospital.  Bell sued HBE, asserting that HBE’s plans and specifications were deficient and failed to meet requirements of the applicable regulatory agencies, resulting in 15 months of delay to the project.  Bell initially sued HBE in State Court.  However, the case was removed to federal court, and the federal court stayed the proceedings pending conclusion of arbitration.

The subcontract provided that:  all claims between HBE and Bell shall be decided by arbitration; the arbitration shall be per the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association; the arbitration provisions shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and “unless [HBE] requests the locale to be the place of the Project, the arbitration locale shall be St. Louis, Missouri.  Bell sought relief from the venue provision, based upon a California Statute, C.C.P. § 410.42(a)(1), which provides:

(a) The following provisions of a contract between the contractor and a subcontractor with principal offices in this state, for the construction of a public or private work of improvement in this state, shall be void and unenforceable:
(1) A provision which purports to require any dispute between the parties to be litigated, arbitrated, or otherwise determined outside this state.

United States ex rel. J.A. Manning Constr. Co. v. Bronze Oak, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6054 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017)

 In May 2014 the Cherokee Nation issued a bid notice for bridge and roadway construction in Mayes County, Oklahoma (the “Project”). Funding was authorized pursuant to the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of the Interior’s Tribal Transportation Program, 23 U.S.C. § 202, by which federal funding is offered to Native American tribal governments to pay the costs of certain transportation projects located on, or providing access to, tribal lands.

Bronze Oak, LLC submitted a bid proposal and was hired as the general contractor for Project, and J.A. Manning Construction Company (“JAMCC”) was hired as a subcontractor to supply labor and materials to the Project. Bronze Oak’s bid proposal provided that any resulting contract would be construed under U.S. and Cherokee Nation laws.  A payment bond was issued for the Project naming Bronze Oak as the principal, Mid-Continental Casualty Company as surety, and the United States as obligee.  The payment bond also stated it was for the protection of persons supplying labor and materials pursuant to the Miller Act.

Tri-State Elec., Inc. ex rel. Apex Enters. v. Western Sur. Co., 1:14-CV-00245, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4974 (D. Idaho Jan. 11, 2017)

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) contracted with Sygnos, Inc. (“Sygnos”) for improvements to the electrical system at a VA hospital in Boise, Idaho. Sygnos subcontracted a portion of the work to Apex Enterprises, Inc. (“AEI”), who in turn subcontracted a portion of its work to Tri-State Electric, Inc. (“Tri-State”).  Delays plagued the project from the outset, and the work – originally scheduled for completion in 240 days – ultimately took more than 950 days to perform.  Disputes concerning responsibility for and the amount of delay damages ensued.

Sygnos submitted a request for equitable adjustment to the VA as a result of the delays. Receiving no timely response from the VA, Sygnos converted the request for equitable adjustment to a claim for delay damages under the Contract Disputes Act, which the VA and Sygnos settled for $645,000.  AEI and Tri-State subsequently sued Sygnos for delay damages they incurred on the project.  Sygnos did not dispute that AEI and Tri-State had suffered delays but it disputed some categories of damages claimed and cited the no-damage-for-delay clause in Tri-State’s contract as barring its claims.

D.W. Wilburn, Inc. v. K. Norman Berry Assocs., No. 2015-CA-001254-MR, 2016 Ky. App. Lexis 206 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016)

This case arose out of a construction project in which the Oldham County Board of Education (the “Board”) was the owner, K. Norman Berry Associates (“KNBA”) was the architect and D.W. Wilburn (“Wilburn”) was the general contractor. The Board’s contract with Wilburn provided that: (i) change orders must be signed by the architect, contractor, and owner; (ii) claims for additional time, money or delay damages must be submitted within twenty-one days of the event giving rise to the claim; (iii) change orders resolved all claims for time and money relating to the scope of the change order, and (iv) the contractor’s acceptance of final payment waived its claims, except those identified in writing as unsettled at the time of final application for payment.  Pursuant to the contract, the parties executed twenty-one change orders and Wilburn submitted a final payment application and closeout form.

Later, Wilburn was sued by one of its subcontractors for delay to the project. Wilburn then sued KNBA in a third party complaint asserting that KNBA was liable for the delay as a result of its defective plans and specifications.  The trial court granted KNBA summary judgment, dismissing Wilburn’s claim for lack of contractual privity.  Wilburn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

Port of Houston Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Zachry Constr. Corp., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13306 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Dec. 15, 2016)

This contract dispute dates back to 2004, when the Port of Houston Authority contracted with Zachry Construction to build a shipping wharf in Harris County, Texas. Zachry’s bid proposed, as part of its means and methods, building the wharf “in the dry” by using a frozen earthen wall to seal out water from the construction area. Several months into the project the Port Authority decided to extend the wharf. Zachry again proposed freeze-wall technology for the extension, and the parties entered into a change order.
The Port Authority then refused to approve Zachry’s frozen wall design, and directed Zachry to either present an alternative design or alternate means of mitigating risk. Unable to identify a viable alternative design, Zachry switched from the frozen wall design and completed the construction “in the wet.”

Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Thompson Masonry Contractor, Inc., et. al., No. 151780, 2016 Va. LEXIS 166 (Va. Nov. 3, 2016)

The dispute arose from the construction of a student health and fitness center at Virginia Tech. The prime contractor, Hensel Phelps, and its subcontractors substantially completed their work in 1998, and Virginia Tech made final payment in 1999. In April 2012, Virginia Tech discovered defects in the work, elected to repair them, and then sought to recover the costs from Hensel Phelps. Despite the significant passage of time between completion of the work and Virginia Tech’s assertion of its claims, Hensel Phelps could not invoke the statute of limitations because under Virginia Code § 8.01-231, statutes of limitation do not apply to claims asserted by Commonwealth agencies such as Virginia Tech.  Ultimately, Hensel Phelps paid $3,000,000 to Virginia Tech to settle the defective work claims.

Hensel Phelps, in turn, sought to recover from the subcontractors that performed the defective work. When the subcontractors refused to pay, Hensel Phelps commenced an action alleging, among other things, breach of contract against the subcontractors and their sureties. All of the defendants argued that Hensel Phelps’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The lower courts agreed. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.

Tilson Home Corp. v. Zepeda, No. 14-16-00075-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12022 (Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2016)

The Court of Appeals of Texas has held that an arbitrator—not a trial court—must determine whether a prerequisite to the obligation to arbitrate has been met. Thus, when faced with the procedural question of whether an arbitration demand was timely filed, Texas trial courts must compel arbitration, leaving the question to the arbitrator. 

In Tilson Home Corp., Jorge and Lisa Zepeda hired Tilson to build a home on their property.  The contract’s arbitration provision stated:

Any dispute or claim which arise[s] from or relates to this Agreement, the Work and/or the Home will be barred unless the claim is filed with the [AAA] by Owner or Contractor within two (2) years and one (1) day from the date the cause of action accrues.