Parkcrest Builders, LLC v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125012 (E.D. La. August 8, 2017)

The Housing Authority of New Orleans (“the Authority”) contracted with Parkcrest Builders, LLC (“Parkcrest”) to construct a public housing project.  The Project was delayed and the Authority terminated Parkcrest prior to completion, and entered into a Takeover Agreement with Parkcrest’s Surety.  The Surety retained Parkcrest to complete the work, and later notified the Authority that it had achieved substantial completion.  The Authority asserted deficient and incomplete items remained on the project, which the Surety refused to complete.  The Authority then solicited bids for the remaining work, and awarded the work to a replacement contractor.

Parkcrest sued the Authority for breach of contract and also asserted that any delays on the Project were excusable and, therefore, not subject to liquidated damages.  The Authority counterclaimed against Parkcrest for added costs to complete the project.  The Surety intervened, also seeking a ruling that all delays were excusable.  The Authority then counterclaimed against the Surety for completion costs.

RDA Constr. Corp. v. United States, No. 11-555 C, 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 875 (Fed. Cl. July 27, 2017)

This case arises out of a public construction project at the Newport Naval Station.  The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (“NAVFAC”) contracted with RDA Construction (“RDA”) for the demolition, removal and reconstruction of a fifty-year-old deteriorating wharf and bulkhead.  The wharf was supported by 248 steel H-pile beams, encased in concrete and driven into the sea floor.  In 2005, NAVFAC commissioned the Appledore Report which found that these structures exhibited advanced deterioration, much of which could only be observed during underwater inspection and could not support any vehicular loads.  A second report, commissioned in 2008, recommended that the structure not be used during its reconstruction.

In May 2009, NAVFAC issued its project solicitation but did not disclose these reports or their findings.  Instead, NAVFAC invited bidders to the site and encouraged them to investigate it carefully.  Hazardous site conditions were marked with sawhorses, barriers and fencing.  After visiting the site, RDA submitted its bid and was identified as the apparent low bidder.  Two days later, NAVFAC notified RDA that its bid was “substantially lower” than NAVFAC’s estimate and requested that it review and confirm its bid and the scope of work.  RDA assured NAVFAC that it had made no mistakes and would honor its bid.  RDA then provided its technical and management plans to NAVFAC, noting that it planned to perform demolition work from the wharf using land-based equipment.  After receipt of these plans, NAVFAC awarded the contract to RDA; RDA signed the contract on October 13, 2009 and received its Notice to Proceed two days later.  In November, at a pre-construction meeting, RDA again explained its plan to use the wharf during construction as a staging area for its excavators and demolition equipment.  NAVFAC personnel were “shocked” by this plan because the wharf was “condemned”  and subsequently provided RDA with the Appledore report.

Fogelson v. Bozzone, 2017 N.M. App. LEXIS 58 (July 26, 2017)

In May of 2008, Wallen Development, LLC (“Wallen”) entered into a written agreement to construct and sell a new home to David and Corinne Fogelson (“Fogelson”).  But, after Fogelson paid Wallen in excess of $165,111 under the agreement, Wallen went out of business as a result of financial difficulties.
Fogelson filed an arbitration action against Wallen and ultimately obtained a default judgment after Wallen failed to appear.  Thereafter, Fogelson filed a complaint in court against various individuals affiliated with Wallen.  As relevant here, Fogelson asserted a claim under New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act, NMSA 1978 §§ 57-12-1 to -26 against one of Wallen’s owners, Mark Bozzone (“Bozzone”).  Bozzone filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that “construction services”, such as those provided by Wallen, do not fall within the scope of the Unfair Practices Act.  The trial court granted Bozzone’s motion.

The major issue on appeal was whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to an arbitration proceeding.  After a very lengthy discussion covering over half of the opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled the res judicata did apply to the arbitration result against Wallen.

Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC, No. 17-cv-00224-YGR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111767, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2017)

This matter came before the Court on a motion to vacate a final arbitration award (the “Arbitration Award”) entered in favor of Aspic Engineering and Construction Company “Aspic”) and against ECC International, LLC and ECC CENTCOM Constructors, LLC (collectively, “ECC”).  ECC entered into two prime contracts with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (“USACE”) in connection with two reconstruction projects for police training facilities in Afghanistan (the “Projects”).  These prime contracts incorporated, among other things, Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”) Sections 49.206 and 52.249-2, which allowed USACE to terminate the Projects for convenience.  ECC subcontracted portions of the work on the Projects to Aspic.  The subcontracts between ECC and Aspic likewise incorporated several FAR sections.  Although Aspic is an Afghan engineering and contracting firm, it had experience in contracting with the U.S. government and a familiarity with the U.S. Government contract requirements, including FAR clauses.  After ECC and Aspic had partially performed work on the Projects, USACE issued a notice of termination for convenience, which ended the Projects in their entirety.

Aspic filed a demand for arbitration, seeking to recover its lost profits on the Projects.

Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Carothers Constr., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111021 (D.S.C. July 18, 2017); Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Carothers Constr., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135948 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017)

Two recent decisions from United States District Courts for the District of South Carolina and the District of Kansas, respectively, reached opposite conclusions when presented with the same issue:  Is a surety bound to arbitrate claims against it when the surety’s bond incorporates its principal’s contract by reference, and the principal’s contract contains an agreement to arbitrate disputes.  The District of South Carolina, applying South Carolina law, held that a surety is bound by the arbitration agreement in the incorporated contract, while the District of Kansas held that a surety is not so bound.

These cases both arise from an arbitration demand filed by the general contractor, Carothers Construction, Inc. (“Carothers”) against the surety, Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (“DSI”).  DSI issued performance and payment bonds on behalf of subcontractors Liberty Enterprises Specialty Contractor (“Liberty”) and Seven Hills Construction, LLC (“Seven Hills”) in favor of Carothers for their work on Projects located in South Carolina and Kansas, respectively.  Each subcontractor defaulted on its contractual obligations.  Carothers initiated arbitration against DSI regarding both Projects.  According to Carothers, the bonds incorporated by reference the subcontracts’ mandatory arbitration clauses and thus, DSI was subject to binding arbitration.  In declaratory judgment actions before Federal District Courts in South Carolina and Kansas, DSI asked the courts to declare that the arbitration clause did not bind it to arbitrate Carothers’ claims.  Each court reached the directly opposite conclusion.  This article discusses the decision reached by each court in turn.

Dlorah, Inc. v. KLE Constr., LLC, No. CIV. 16-5102-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11043 (D.S.D. July 17, 2017)

Plaintiff, Dlorah, Inc. (“Dlorah”), filed suit against defendant, KLE Construction, LLC (“KLE”), in connection with an agreement for KLE to perform construction services at an apartment complex in Rapid City, South Dakota.  According to Dlorah, KLE’s actions while carrying out the construction breached the agreement and constituted fraud/deceit.

KLE moved the court to compel arbitration or alternatively stay the proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the parties’ agreement.  Dlorah objected to KLE’s motion on three grounds: (i) defendant had not satisfied the conditions precedent to compel arbitration; (ii) the dispute at issue did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause; and (iii) the arbitration clause was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore permitted Dlorah to file suit in court.  After concluding that the parties had in fact entered into a binding arbitration agreement, the court considered and rejected each of Dlorah’s arguments.

King Cnty. v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets/Parsons RCI/ Frontier-Kemper, JV, No. 92744-8, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 743 (July 6, 2017)

King County contracted with three construction firms (collectively, “VPFK”) to construct a tunnel.  The contract required substantial completion by November 14, 2010 (the “contract time”).  It also required VPFK to secure a performance bond from five surety companies, under which the sureties were to remedy any default in VPFK’s performance.

VPFK experienced difficulties with its tunnel-boring equipment and was unable to dig nearly as fast as estimated.  When it became clear that VPFK would not achieve substantial completion by the contract time, King County declared VPFK in default.  The sureties refused King County’s request for a cure, arguing that because the contract time had not passed, no default had yet occurred.

King County filed a breach of contract action against VPFK and the sureties, who denied coverage and adopted all of VPFK’s defenses.  A jury found in favor of King County and awarded nearly $130 million in damages.

TK Servs., Inc. v. RWD Consulting, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 97239 (D.D.C., June 23, 2017)

This litigation arose from a dispute between TK Services, Inc. (“TKS”), as sub-subcontractor, and RWD Consulting, LLC (“RWD”), as prime subcontractor, in connection with a sub-subcontract (the “Subcontract”), whereby TKS agreed to be responsible for managing operation and maintenance-related services (the “Services”) for the Environmental Protection Agency headquarters in Washington DC (the “Project” or the “EPA Building”) in exchange for a monthly fixed fee and a percentage of profits derived from reimbursable projects performed at the EPA Building.  Pursuant to the Subcontract, all funds received by RWD as payment for the Services performed at the Project and all working capital provided by TKS were to be deposited into a joint bank account to which both TKS and RWD were signatories.

In its complaint, TKS alleged that RWD (1) breached the Subcontract by failing to properly compensate TKS and excluding TKS from accessing the EPA Building, (2) converted the funds in the joint bank account by unilaterally closing the account, and (3) was unjustly enriched by its improper conduct.  TKS also moved for a preliminary injunction to sequester the profits received by RWD in connection with the Project, prevent RWD from excluding TKS from the EPA Building and the joint bank account, and reinstate TKS to its prior role under the Subcontract.

Universal Acad. v. Berkshire Dev., 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 975 (Ct. App. June 20, 2017)

The dispute arose out of an agreement between Universal Academy (“Universal”) and Berkshire Development (“Berkshire”), under which Berkshire agreed to provide demolition services to Universal and Hamadeh Education Services (“HES”).  The agreement also contained an arbitration provision which provided in part:

In the event of a dispute between Contractor and the Owner that cannot be resolved, the parties agree to binding arbitration with the American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Construction Industry’s Rules of the American Arbitration Association in effect as of the date of this Agreement.

The agreement was terminated by Universal, alleging material breaches by Berkshire.  Following termination, subcontractors for the project filed a complaint against Berkshire, Universal, and HES, requesting foreclosure of construction liens and payment for services.  In response, Berkshire filed a cross-complaint against Universal and HES, requesting foreclosure of its lien and asserting claims of promissory estoppel and fraudulent inducement.  Five months after it filed the cross-complaint, Berkshire filed a motion to enforce the arbitration agreement between it and Universal.

Girolametti v. Michael Horton Assoc., 2017 Conn. App. Lexis 228 (June 6, 2017)

A General Contractor brought claims for unpaid added work, via mandatory arbitration, against a building owner who asserted defective work claims in response.  The Owner abandoned the arbitration mid-process after a partial presentation of its claims.  The arbitrator ruled in favor of the General Contractor, awarding $508,597 in damages, which was affirmed by the Superior Court and Appellate Court.  The Owner then attempted to bring the same defective work claims in state court against the General Contractor, its subcontractors, and the Owner’s testing company on the project.  The defendants all filed motions for summary judgment asserting the defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
The trial court granted the General Contractor’s motion but denied the subcontractors’ and testing company’s motions on the basis that both collateral estoppel and res judicata required privity between those entities and the General Contractor.

The Court of Appeals discussed each motion in detail.  As to the Owner’s claims against the General Contractor, the Court found that the Owner’s complaint involved the same claims of design and installation defects as had been raised or could have been raised in the arbitration.  The Owner had a full and fair opportunity to present his claims against the General Contractor in arbitration.  Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed on the basis of res judicata.