Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC, No. 17-cv-00224-YGR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111767, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2017)

This matter came before the Court on a motion to vacate a final arbitration award (the “Arbitration Award”) entered in favor of Aspic Engineering and Construction Company “Aspic”) and against ECC International, LLC and ECC CENTCOM Constructors, LLC (collectively, “ECC”).  ECC entered into two prime contracts with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (“USACE”) in connection with two reconstruction projects for police training facilities in Afghanistan (the “Projects”).  These prime contracts incorporated, among other things, Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”) Sections 49.206 and 52.249-2, which allowed USACE to terminate the Projects for convenience.  ECC subcontracted portions of the work on the Projects to Aspic.  The subcontracts between ECC and Aspic likewise incorporated several FAR sections.  Although Aspic is an Afghan engineering and contracting firm, it had experience in contracting with the U.S. government and a familiarity with the U.S. Government contract requirements, including FAR clauses.  After ECC and Aspic had partially performed work on the Projects, USACE issued a notice of termination for convenience, which ended the Projects in their entirety.

Aspic filed a demand for arbitration, seeking to recover its lost profits on the Projects.

Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Carothers Constr., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111021 (D.S.C. July 18, 2017); Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Carothers Constr., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135948 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017)

Two recent decisions from United States District Courts for the District of South Carolina and the District of Kansas, respectively, reached opposite conclusions when presented with the same issue:  Is a surety bound to arbitrate claims against it when the surety’s bond incorporates its principal’s contract by reference, and the principal’s contract contains an agreement to arbitrate disputes.  The District of South Carolina, applying South Carolina law, held that a surety is bound by the arbitration agreement in the incorporated contract, while the District of Kansas held that a surety is not so bound.

These cases both arise from an arbitration demand filed by the general contractor, Carothers Construction, Inc. (“Carothers”) against the surety, Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (“DSI”).  DSI issued performance and payment bonds on behalf of subcontractors Liberty Enterprises Specialty Contractor (“Liberty”) and Seven Hills Construction, LLC (“Seven Hills”) in favor of Carothers for their work on Projects located in South Carolina and Kansas, respectively.  Each subcontractor defaulted on its contractual obligations.  Carothers initiated arbitration against DSI regarding both Projects.  According to Carothers, the bonds incorporated by reference the subcontracts’ mandatory arbitration clauses and thus, DSI was subject to binding arbitration.  In declaratory judgment actions before Federal District Courts in South Carolina and Kansas, DSI asked the courts to declare that the arbitration clause did not bind it to arbitrate Carothers’ claims.  Each court reached the directly opposite conclusion.  This article discusses the decision reached by each court in turn.

Dlorah, Inc. v. KLE Constr., LLC, No. CIV. 16-5102-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11043 (D.S.D. July 17, 2017)

Plaintiff, Dlorah, Inc. (“Dlorah”), filed suit against defendant, KLE Construction, LLC (“KLE”), in connection with an agreement for KLE to perform construction services at an apartment complex in Rapid City, South Dakota.  According to Dlorah, KLE’s actions while carrying out the construction breached the agreement and constituted fraud/deceit.

KLE moved the court to compel arbitration or alternatively stay the proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the parties’ agreement.  Dlorah objected to KLE’s motion on three grounds: (i) defendant had not satisfied the conditions precedent to compel arbitration; (ii) the dispute at issue did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause; and (iii) the arbitration clause was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore permitted Dlorah to file suit in court.  After concluding that the parties had in fact entered into a binding arbitration agreement, the court considered and rejected each of Dlorah’s arguments.

King Cnty. v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets/Parsons RCI/ Frontier-Kemper, JV, No. 92744-8, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 743 (July 6, 2017)

King County contracted with three construction firms (collectively, “VPFK”) to construct a tunnel.  The contract required substantial completion by November 14, 2010 (the “contract time”).  It also required VPFK to secure a performance bond from five surety companies, under which the sureties were to remedy any default in VPFK’s performance.

VPFK experienced difficulties with its tunnel-boring equipment and was unable to dig nearly as fast as estimated.  When it became clear that VPFK would not achieve substantial completion by the contract time, King County declared VPFK in default.  The sureties refused King County’s request for a cure, arguing that because the contract time had not passed, no default had yet occurred.

King County filed a breach of contract action against VPFK and the sureties, who denied coverage and adopted all of VPFK’s defenses.  A jury found in favor of King County and awarded nearly $130 million in damages.

TK Servs., Inc. v. RWD Consulting, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 97239 (D.D.C., June 23, 2017)

This litigation arose from a dispute between TK Services, Inc. (“TKS”), as sub-subcontractor, and RWD Consulting, LLC (“RWD”), as prime subcontractor, in connection with a sub-subcontract (the “Subcontract”), whereby TKS agreed to be responsible for managing operation and maintenance-related services (the “Services”) for the Environmental Protection Agency headquarters in Washington DC (the “Project” or the “EPA Building”) in exchange for a monthly fixed fee and a percentage of profits derived from reimbursable projects performed at the EPA Building.  Pursuant to the Subcontract, all funds received by RWD as payment for the Services performed at the Project and all working capital provided by TKS were to be deposited into a joint bank account to which both TKS and RWD were signatories.

In its complaint, TKS alleged that RWD (1) breached the Subcontract by failing to properly compensate TKS and excluding TKS from accessing the EPA Building, (2) converted the funds in the joint bank account by unilaterally closing the account, and (3) was unjustly enriched by its improper conduct.  TKS also moved for a preliminary injunction to sequester the profits received by RWD in connection with the Project, prevent RWD from excluding TKS from the EPA Building and the joint bank account, and reinstate TKS to its prior role under the Subcontract.

Universal Acad. v. Berkshire Dev., 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 975 (Ct. App. June 20, 2017)

The dispute arose out of an agreement between Universal Academy (“Universal”) and Berkshire Development (“Berkshire”), under which Berkshire agreed to provide demolition services to Universal and Hamadeh Education Services (“HES”).  The agreement also contained an arbitration provision which provided in part:

In the event of a dispute between Contractor and the Owner that cannot be resolved, the parties agree to binding arbitration with the American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Construction Industry’s Rules of the American Arbitration Association in effect as of the date of this Agreement.

The agreement was terminated by Universal, alleging material breaches by Berkshire.  Following termination, subcontractors for the project filed a complaint against Berkshire, Universal, and HES, requesting foreclosure of construction liens and payment for services.  In response, Berkshire filed a cross-complaint against Universal and HES, requesting foreclosure of its lien and asserting claims of promissory estoppel and fraudulent inducement.  Five months after it filed the cross-complaint, Berkshire filed a motion to enforce the arbitration agreement between it and Universal.

Girolametti v. Michael Horton Assoc., 2017 Conn. App. Lexis 228 (June 6, 2017)

A General Contractor brought claims for unpaid added work, via mandatory arbitration, against a building owner who asserted defective work claims in response.  The Owner abandoned the arbitration mid-process after a partial presentation of its claims.  The arbitrator ruled in favor of the General Contractor, awarding $508,597 in damages, which was affirmed by the Superior Court and Appellate Court.  The Owner then attempted to bring the same defective work claims in state court against the General Contractor, its subcontractors, and the Owner’s testing company on the project.  The defendants all filed motions for summary judgment asserting the defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
The trial court granted the General Contractor’s motion but denied the subcontractors’ and testing company’s motions on the basis that both collateral estoppel and res judicata required privity between those entities and the General Contractor.

The Court of Appeals discussed each motion in detail.  As to the Owner’s claims against the General Contractor, the Court found that the Owner’s complaint involved the same claims of design and installation defects as had been raised or could have been raised in the arbitration.  The Owner had a full and fair opportunity to present his claims against the General Contractor in arbitration.  Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed on the basis of res judicata.

P&N Invs. v. Frontier Mall Assocs., 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2017)

This payment dispute arose over conditional language in a lease agreement between a mall and a restaurant operator.  P&N Investments (“P&N”) leased space from Frontier Mall Associates, LP (“Mall”) to operate a restaurant.  The lease contained a “finish allowance” under which Mall agreed to cover some of P&N’s costs to renovate the space, up to $150,180.

The finish allowance was conditioned on the following provision:

[P&N] shall have furnished evidence satisfactory to Mall from its general contractor and any subcontractors that any and all liens that have been, or may be, filed have been satisfied of record or waived and an affidavit that all work has been paid for.

P&N hired CCI as its general contractor, and CCI in turn hired subcontractors, to renovate the space.  P&N paid CCI in full once CCI and its subcontractors completed the work.  The amount paid was $308,930.  CCI, however, failed to pay its subcontractors in full.  The unpaid amount was approximately $90,000.  Mall refused to pay P&N the finish allowance despite the fact that P&N paid CCI in full and submitted an affidavit stating that no liens were, or could be, filed because of time limitations for liens had expired.

City of Dardenne Prairie v. Adams Concrete & Masonry, LLC, No. ED104982, 2017 Mo. App. LEXIS 533 (Mo. Ct. App. May 30, 2017)

This case arises out of a construction project in which the City of Dardenne Prairie (the “City”) purchased bricks for its construction of two buildings—a new city hall and a parks maintenance building—from Adams Concrete & Masonry, LLC (“ACM”).  In October 2008, the City enacted two ordinances authorizing the construction of the new city hall, but did not enact any ordinances authorizing the construction of the parks maintenance building.  Such authorization—and approval—by the City’s Board of Aldermen (“Board”) is required by law for public projects in Missouri.  Nevertheless, the City executed an agreement with ACM for the purchase of bricks and provision of masonry work for both projects.  In November 2009, the City paid ACM in full for all of the bricks.  But in December 2010, the City decided not to construct its parks maintenance building and thus, the bricks for it were never delivered.

In 2014, the City contacted ACM regarding the location of the undelivered bricks.  Upon learning that ACM’s fabricator had already resold the bricks, the City sued ACM for breach of contract to recover the cost of the undelivered bricks, averring that ACM had breached its purchase agreement by failing to deliver the materials.  ACM counterclaimed for breach of contract, claiming that the City was in breach by cancelling the construction of the parks maintenance building, thereby preventing ACM from completing its masonry work.  The City raised an affirmative defense, asserting that its agreement with ACM had not been approved by the City’s Board as required and thus was not enforceable.  ACM seized on the City’s assertion and moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing that, through this affirmative defense, the City admitted that its Board had not approved the agreement, and thus, the agreement was void and the City, too, was barred from recovering for breach of a contract that never existed.  The trial court sustained ACM’s motion and dismissed the claim and counterclaim.

Iliescu v. Steppan, No. 68346, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 38, (Nevada Supreme Court, May 25, 2017)

Appellants Iliescu entered into a Land Purchase Agreement to sell four unimproved parcels in downtown Reno, Nevada to Consolidated Pacific Development (“CPD”) for development of a high-rise, mixed-use project to be known as Wingfield Towers, which agreement was subsequently assigned to BSC Investments, LLC (“BSC”).  BSC subsequently hired Mark Steppan (“Steppan”), to provide design services for the Wingfield Towers.  Financing was never obtained for the project and the escrow never closed on the sale of appellants’ property.  In addition, since BSC did not pay Steppan for his services, Steppan recorded a mechanic’s lien against appellants’ property.  However, Steppan did not provide appellants with a pre-lien notice.

In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the actual notice exception for pre-lien notices should be extended to offsite work and services performed by an architect for a prospective buyer of the property.  NRS 108.245(1) requires a mechanic’s lien claimant, other than one who performs only labor, to deliver a written notice to the owner of the property of the right to lien after they first perform work on or provide material to a project.  However, substantial compliance with this requirements is met if the property owner: (1) has actual notice of the construction on the property and (2) knows the lien claimant’s identity.