Design/Build

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Alkemade v. Quanta Indem. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6896 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017)

 In 1994, Adrianus and Rachelle Alkemade (the “Alkemades”) bought a house from Meltebeke Built Paradise Homes (“Meltebeke”). The home was built on expanding soils, causing significant structural damage.  Meltebeke repaired the existing damage and hired an engineering firm to install a helical pier foundation, which would have prevented any further damage to the home.  However, the helical pier foundation was also installed negligently, afflicting the home with the same type of structural damage as before.

Alkemades sued Meltebeke for negligent supervision of the helical piers installation. Meltebeke entered a settlement agreement with Alkemades in which Meltebeke assigned to Alkemades the right to sue its insurers, Quanta and GFIC, who refused to defend Meltebeke on grounds that its knowledge of the damage caused by the original, defective construction prevented coverage under a known damages provision in Meltebeke’s policies (the “Policies”).  Alkemades subsequently sued the issuers for breach of contract in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon for their failure to defend and indemnify Meltebeke.  The insurers moved for summary judgment.

The Policies excluded coverage for damage known by the insured, in whole or in part, that occurred before the policy period began. If such damage was known to the insured, then any “any continuation, change or resumption” of that damage was also deemed known, and excluded.

LaShip, LLC v. Hayward Baker, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3694 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2017)

Beginning in 2007, LaShip, LLC (“LaShip”) undertook the construction of a large shipbuilding facility in Houma, Louisiana (the “Project”), situated on its own private land as well as land owned by the Terrebonne Port Commission (“TPC) – a subdivision of the Louisiana state government. In July 2008, LaShip accepted a bid from Hayward Baker, Inc. (“HBI”) to complete the soil mixing and drill shaft work on the Project.

The contract between LaShip and HBI (the “Contract”) provided for HBI to install subterranean soil-mix columns to form the foundation of the shipbuilding facility and prevent it from collapsing into the soft and compressible Louisiana soil. Pursuant to the Contract, HBI obtained soil samples to ascertain the columns’ strength.  Laboratory testing revealed that, in general, the soil possessed the requisite compressive strength provided for in the Contract.  Nevertheless, as the work progressed the columns exhibited spiraling, and HBI experienced several cave-ins during its installation of the drill shafts and unwanted settlement of the foundation columns.

On January 21, 2011, LaShip filed suit against HBI in the Louisiana Federal District Court alleging that HBI violated Louisiana law by not warning LaShip about alleged defects in the design of the columns. TPC joined the lawsuit on March 6, 2013, also claiming that HBI acted negligently in failing to warn of a dangerous condition.  The District Court ruled that LaShip failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its claims against HBI.  LaShip and TPC then appealed.

Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc., 2017 Cal. LEXIS 1024 (Cal. February 16, 2017)

This tort lawsuit relates to a dispute over the bidding process on several public works contracts in California. Between 2009 and 2012, American Asphalt outbid Roy Allan Slurry Seal and Doug Martin Contracting on 23 public works contracts for the application of slurry seal to roadways in five California counties.

Allan and Martin suspected that American illegally underbid them, and they sued American for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. They alleged that American illegally under-paid its employees to ensure that it won the bid as the lowest “responsible” bidder.  Allan and Martin alleged that but for American’s illegal conduct, they would have been awarded the contracts because they were the second lowest bidders.

The trial court dismissed Allan and Martin’s complaint holding that it failed to state a viable claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The appellate court reversed the trial court, but American appealed to the Supreme Court of California.

Lend Lease (US) Constr. LMB Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 11, 2017 N.Y. LEXIS 112 (N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017)

Early, in its opinion, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “[o]ne of the most dramatic images of [Superstorm Sandy] depicts the damage caused to [a] crane [being used on the construction of a 74-story skyscraper] when the boom of the crane collapsed in high winds and teetered precariously from a height equal to the top of the building.” At the time of the incident, Extell, the owner of the project, was the named insured on a $700 million builder’s risk insurance program comprised of five separate insurance policies.  Lend Lease, the contractor, was an additional insured on the policies.

Following the incident, Extell and Lend Lease submitted a claim to the insurers seeking to recover the damages incurred by Extell and Lend Lease resulting from weather-related harm to the crane. The insurers denied the claim and disclaimed that there was coverage under the policies.  This action ensued.  Both parties filed motions seeking summary judgment on the coverage issue.  The trial court denied the motions, ruling that there was an issue of fact regarding the applicability of certain exclusions in the policies.  On appeal, the Appellate Division granted the insurers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no coverage because the crane did not fall within the policies’ definition of “temporary works.”  This appeal followed.

Resolving the appeal required the Court of Appeals to answer two questions. First, was the damage to the crane covered under the policies in the first instance.  Second, if there was coverage, was it defeated by the policies’ contractor’s tools exclusion.  As explained below, the court concluded that although there may have been coverage in the first instance, the coverage was defeated by the exclusion.

D.W. Wilburn, Inc. v. K. Norman Berry Assocs., No. 2015-CA-001254-MR, 2016 Ky. App. Lexis 206 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016)

This case arose out of a construction project in which the Oldham County Board of Education (the “Board”) was the owner, K. Norman Berry Associates (“KNBA”) was the architect and D.W. Wilburn (“Wilburn”) was the general contractor. The Board’s contract with Wilburn provided that: (i) change orders must be signed by the architect, contractor, and owner; (ii) claims for additional time, money or delay damages must be submitted within twenty-one days of the event giving rise to the claim; (iii) change orders resolved all claims for time and money relating to the scope of the change order, and (iv) the contractor’s acceptance of final payment waived its claims, except those identified in writing as unsettled at the time of final application for payment.  Pursuant to the contract, the parties executed twenty-one change orders and Wilburn submitted a final payment application and closeout form.

Later, Wilburn was sued by one of its subcontractors for delay to the project. Wilburn then sued KNBA in a third party complaint asserting that KNBA was liable for the delay as a result of its defective plans and specifications.  The trial court granted KNBA summary judgment, dismissing Wilburn’s claim for lack of contractual privity.  Wilburn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

Port of Houston Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Zachry Constr. Corp., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13306 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Dec. 15, 2016)

This contract dispute dates back to 2004, when the Port of Houston Authority contracted with Zachry Construction to build a shipping wharf in Harris County, Texas. Zachry’s bid proposed, as part of its means and methods, building the wharf “in the dry” by using a frozen earthen wall to seal out water from the construction area. Several months into the project the Port Authority decided to extend the wharf. Zachry again proposed freeze-wall technology for the extension, and the parties entered into a change order.
The Port Authority then refused to approve Zachry’s frozen wall design, and directed Zachry to either present an alternative design or alternate means of mitigating risk. Unable to identify a viable alternative design, Zachry switched from the frozen wall design and completed the construction “in the wet.”

Allstate Insurance Company v. Structures Design/Build, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34349 (WD VA March 17, 2016)

This construction dispute case arises from a failed pipe connector that caused water damage to a facility and insured personal property, which Hillel at Virginia Tech, Inc. (“Hillel”) owned in Blacksburg, Virginia. Hillel contracted Structures Design/Build, LLC (“Structures”) to design and construct the facility. Structures, in turn, subcontracted PJ Little Plumbing, Inc. (“PJ”) for plumbing and mechanical installation. PJ purchased the failed pipe connector from CMC Supply, Inc. (“CMC”). Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) insured Hillel for the damage to the facility and the personal property.

As Hillel’s subrogee, Allstate filed a complaint against Structures and PJ. Allstate sued Structures for various state law claims. It sued PJ for negligence and breach of express and implied warranties. PJ filed a third-party complaint to join CMC on a breach of implied warranty theory. PJ and CMC moved to dismiss the claims against them.

Turner Constr. Co. v. BFPE Int’l, Inc., No. JKB-15-368, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39161 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2016)

The University of Maryland Medical Center (“UMMC”) entered into a contract (the “Prime Contract”) with Turner Construction Company (“Turner”), pursuant to which Turner agreed to renovate UMMC’s hospital offices.  Turner then entered into a subcontract (the “Subcontract”) with BFPE International, Inc. (“BFPE”), pursuant to which BFPE agreed to perform work associated with the fire protection system, including demolishing sprinkler piping and coordinating sprinkler outages to accommodate the renovations.
The Prime Contract included a waiver of subrogation, under which UMMC and Turner waived all rights against each other and any subcontractors for damages covered by property insurance, even if the subcontractor would otherwise have a duty to indemnify.[i]  The Subcontract incorporated the Prime Contract by reference and included flow down provisions, but the Subcontract also stated that if any provision “irreconcilably conflicts” with a provision of the Prime Contract, “the provision imposing the greater duty or obligation on [BFPE] shall govern.”  The Subcontract included an assumption of liability, under which BFPE assumed liability for all property damage in connection with its work and agreed to indemnify Turner from any claims that result.[ii]  This assumption of liability seemed inconsistent with the waiver of subrogation in the Prime Contract.

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board v. INET Airport Systems, Inc., et al., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6646, 819 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016)

This action arose out of a construction project in terminal E of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (“DFW”), in which pre-conditioned air and rooftop air handling units were to provide conditioned air (cooling and heating) to passenger boarding bridges and aircrafts parked at terminal gates (the “Project”).  In August, 2009, following a competitive bidding process, owner Dallas Fort Worth International Airport Board (the “Owner”) entered into a contract with contractor INET Airport Systems, Inc. (the “Contractor”) to construct the Project. The plans and specifications for the contract included detailed drawings, the precise rooftop units and parts to be used, approved manufacturers and performance requirements.  Under the contract and these plans, the Contractor was obligated to install operational rooftop units that were required to use 30 percent ethylene glycol/water supplied through DFW’s existing piping system. The Contractor was not allowed to substitute products or designs for those agreed upon in the contract documents without authorization from the Owner. The contract also required that if anything in the agreed-upon plans needed to be changed, the Contractor would alert the Owner and the parties would collaborate to come up with a workaround that would be incorporated into the contract by written change order issued by the Owner with agreed prices for performing the change order work.

Balfour Beatty Rail, Inc. v. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39086 (N.D. Tex., March 25, 2016)

The contractor contracted with owner to install 65 miles of railroad track, for a price of $12,206,666.  The owner had engaged another contractor to grade and prepare the substrate for the railroad track, and was to furnish and deliver aggregate for track ballast and track rail material to various locations along the rail route.  The contractor’s scope included all other work.  The contractor fell behind in its work, and the owner hired additional contractors to complete a portion of its scope.  The contractor blamed the delays on the owner’s late delivery of aggregate and rail, and improper subgrade preparation under a theory of differing site conditions. It sought $4.35 million in unpaid change orders, delay damages, and penalties under Texas’ prompt payment statutes.  The owner in turn sought $2.6 million in completion costs and costs of wasted aggregate.