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Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering, Inc. and Panda Rosemary Corp.,
468 S.E. 2d 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
Defendant Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering, Inc. (HSPE) was the Design/Build contractor on a co-generation power plant in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina. As the general contractor, HSPE subcontracted with plaintiff Metric Constructors, Inc. (Metric) for construction of the power plant. In turn, Metric subcontracted with a wholly-owned subsidiary, Electrical and Special Systems, Inc. (ESSI) for specialized work. Because all of the designs for the plant prior to the commencement of construction were not complete, the project was deemed “Fast Track.”
Pursuant to its contract with Metric, HSPE was responsible for engineering design drawings and procurement of major equipment items. The contract had an inflexible completion date of October 30, 1990 and, in contract negotiations and in the contract, HSPE promised to issue drawings at a pace that would allow Metric to finish its work on time. The contract further provided that Metric would receive a bonus of $9,000 per day for early completion.

A. Hedenberg & Co., Inc., v. St. Luke’s Hospital of Deluth,
1996 Minn. App. LEXIS p. 379 (Minn. Ct. App. April 2, 1996)
In July 1992, St. Luke’s Hospital of Deluth (“Hospital”) contracted with A. Hedenberg & Co., Inc. (“Contractor”) to build a hospital addition. The contract provided for a 240-day construction period and allowed $500 per day as liquidated damages for work not completed within that time period. The contract also included a provision entitled “Claims and Disputes,” and defined claim as:

a demand or assertion by one of the parties seeking, as a matter of right, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, payment of money, expenses and time or other relief with respect to the terms of the contract. The term “claim” also includes other disputes and matters in question between the Owner and Contractor arising out of or relating to the Contract. Claims must be made by written notice.

Holloway Constr. Co. v. Department of Transportation
218 Ga. App. 243, 461 S.E. 2d 257, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (July 13, 1995).
One of several multiple prime contractors was not entitled to sue owner for delays attributable to other prime contractor — on theory of breach of implied or express obligation — in light of clear contractual provision stating that owner would not be liable for delays attributable to contractors. Contractor barred from pursuing claim for extended overhead and equipment costs allegedly attributable to owner-directed changes in the work and owner’s failure to make prompt decisions because contractor did not provide timely request for an extension of time in accordance with contract. 

Tacoma Athletic Club, Inc. v. Indoor Comfort Systems, Inc.,
79 Wash. App. 250, 902 P.2d 175, 1995 Wash. App. LEXIS 406 (Sept. 14, 1995).
In breach of warranty action brought by owner against contractor, contract to furnish and install a “dehumidification system” was considered to be a “sale of goods” governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. pursuant to “predominant factor test.” Evidence was insufficient to establish that owner was entitled to be reimbursed entire amount of original contract plus cost to insulate walls as a result of contractor’s breach of warranty related to dehumidification system. 
The Tacoma Athletic Club (“Owner”) hired Indoor Comfort Systems (“Contractor”) to furnish and install a dehumidification system for an indoor pool. The humidity in the pool area was so high that water dripped from the ceilings and down the walls causing damage to the walls. The system provided by the Contractor failed to reduce the humidity in the pool area. After the Contractor attempted unsuccessfully to solve the moisture problem, the Owner eventually hired a new contractor to attempt to fix the problem. The Owner then sued the Contractor for breach of warranty under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and obtained a favorable judgment.

Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc.; Mosher Steel Co., and Aetna Insurance Co.,
67 F.3d 435, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27614 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 1995).
Contract provision authorizing compensation for delay, “notwithstanding any other provision . . .” held to override “no-damage-for-delay” provisions in other portions of contract as a matter of law. Trial court erred in submitting question of interpretation to jury. 
Morse/Diesel, Inc. (“Morse/Diesel”) was the general contractor for the construction of the Marriott Marquis Hotel in Manhattan’s Times Square. In August, 1982, Morse/Diesel entered into a subcontract with Mosher Steel Company, a division of Trinity Industries, Inc. (“Trinity”) to fabricate and erect the steel members necessary for hotel construction within 13 months, excluding inclement weather. In fact, the job took 20 months, from January, 1983 until September, 1984. Morse/Diesel sued Trinity and Trinity’s bonding company, Aetna Insurance Company, for damages in the amount of $37 million arising from the cost of an acceleration program designed to recapture the delay, as well as losses suffered by the hotel’s owner, the architect and other subcontractors. Trinity counterclaimed for its own damages arising from additional work and delay in completing the subcontract.

Bell South Communications, Inc. dba Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Dekalb Concrete Pro
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11443 (D.S.C. July 27, 1995)
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (“Southern Bell”) initiated interpleader proceedings to determine which one of three Defendants held priority in the debt owed by Southern Bell to the fourth Defendant, Kelly Green, Inc. (“Kelly Green”). Each of the three Defendants were creditors to Kelly Green. In June of 1993, Southern Bell contracted Kelly Green to perform miscellaneous work connected with burying underground telephone cable. Kelly Green, in turn, subcontracted a portion of the work to Defendant Dekalb Concrete Products, Inc. (“Dekalb”). Shortly thereafter, Kelly Green failed to pay Dekalb, Defendant, Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for employment related taxes and Defendant King & Vernon, P.A. (“King & Vernon) for legal services rendered.

Resurgence Properties., Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Construction Co., et. al.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11633 (E.D. Ill. August 11, 1995)
Incorporation by Reference – AIA standard form of agreement between owner and contractor, AIA Document A101/CM, incorporated general conditions, AIA Document A201/CM, by reference even though agreement never specifically identified AIA Document A201/CM. Contractor’s warranty to developer also protects Architect as a third-party beneficiary.

Royal Electric Construction Corp. v. Ohio State University,
73 Ohio St. 3d 110, 652 N.W.2d. 687, 1995 Ohio LEXIS 18905 (Ohio Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 1995)
Prejudgment Interest – Contractor that succeeded on delay and disruption claim was entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date of substantial completion; Ohio rejects rule that pre-judgement interest is only available when claim is “liquidated” or “capable of ascertainment.”

McNally Wellman Company v. New York State Electric & Gas Corporation,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23312 (2d Cir. August 18, 1995)
Exclusion of Consequential Damages – A no-damage-for-delay clause insulated a construction supplier from liability for delays in delivery of six spillway gates on a dam project. The application of the UCC prevented the project owner from invoking the common law exceptions to enforcement of a no-damage-for-delay clause.