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St. Lawrence Explosives v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline,
916 F.Supp. 187 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
The Petitioner, St Lawrence, requested confirmation and judgment to be entered upon an arbitration award in favor of St Lawrence and against the Respondent, Worthy Brothers.
St Lawrence Explosives and Worthy Brothers Pipeline entered into a subcontract for construction of a gas pipeline within New York which would connect into an international pipeline. The subcontract was a Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Subcontractor: AIA Document A401. Article 6.1 of the subcontract provided that if the Prime Contract did not provide for arbitration, then disputes would be resolved in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules (“AAA Rules”). Article 6.4 provided that the award shall be final and judgment may be entered upon it. But, Article 6.4 in the above subcontract agreement was crossed out.

Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Reynoldsburg City Schools,
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2751 (June 28, 1996)
No-damage-for-delay clause in contract is not enforceable if the extent and magnitude of the delay was unforeseeable at the time the contract was executed and, therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted where question of material fact existed concerning the foreseeability of the delay.
Cleveland Construction, Inc. (“Contractor”) entered into a contract with the Reynoldsburg City Schools (“Owner”) for the construction of several projects. The contract provided that the Contractor would begin its work in May 1993 and complete its work ten months later, by February 1994. The Contractor, however, was delayed for two months in beginning the project, was further delayed as a result of difficulties experienced by another of the Owner’s contractors, and was at one point required to temporarily abandon its work and return to the project at a later time. In the end, the originally contemplated ten-month project became an eighteen-month project.

Hancock Electronics Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 81 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 1996).
In the spring of 1994, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) awarded Hancock Electronics Corporation (“Hancock”) a contract to provide replacement braking systems for approximately 300 rail cars. The contract required Hancock to design, manufacture and install the braking systems. The contract further required Hancock to demonstrate its contract performance to WMATA and provide certain technical data about the braking systems.
Because it apparently did not possess the ability to monitor the testing of the brake systems’ software, WMATA subcontracted the testing function to a third party. In addition, as part of the testing process, WMATA requested Hancock to provide certain technical documentation, including the brake systems’ software. WMATA sought Hancock’s permission to provide the technical data to the third party responsible for testing, who had agreed to enter into a lifetime nondisclosure agreement. Hancock refused.

Electro Assocs., Inc. v. Harrop Constr. Co., Inc.,
908 S.W.2d 21 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 1968 (Tex. Ct. App. August 24, 1995).
Because the contractor-subcontractor relationship is not a “special relationship” giving rise to common law duty to act in good faith, subcontractor’s suit against general contractor for breach of…

J.P. Altmayer v. R.W. Johnson,
79 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
GSA had planned to order the carpet and trim for the office by August 1992 but did not do so despite repeated requests from Altmayer who tried to impress the importance of this for the contract to be completed…

Lahr Construction Corp. (doing business as LeCesse Construction Co.) v. J. Kozel & Son, Inc.,
640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Misc 1996).
This is an action brought by a general contractor against a subcontractor for damages where the subcontractor moved for summary judgment saying that the general contractor could not recover damages…

Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Company, Inc.,
342 Md. 143; 674 A.2d 521; (1996)
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) solicited bids for a renovation project. Pavel Enterprises Incorporated (PEI), a general contractor, prepared a bid for the NIH work. In preparing its bid, PEI solicited sub-bids from various mechanical subcontractors. The A.S. Johnson Company (Johnson), a mechanical subcontractor, responded with a written scope of work proposal on July 27, 1993, giving a verbally submitted bid price on the morning of August 5, 1993, the day NIH opened the general contractors’ bids. Neither party disputes that PEI used Johnson’s sub-bid in computing its own bid.

West-Fair Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
78 F.3d 61, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3912 (2d Cir. March 6, 1996).
Neither general contractor nor surety could assert pay-when-paid clause as defense to payment claim by subcontractor because clause, which operated as a condition precedent to payment, constituted a prospective waiver of lien rights and therefore violated New York Lien Law. 
Defendant Gilbane Construction Co. (“General Contractor”) was the general contractor on a construction project in White Plains, NY. General Contractor hired plaintiff L.J. Coppola, Inc. (“Subcontractor”) to perform a portion of the work. General Contractor maintained a payment bond with defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. (“Surety”) for the benefit of all its subcontractors.

H. Verby Co., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
1996 E.S. Dist. LEXIS 3056 (March 13, 1996) (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.).
A material supplier was entitled to recover on the general contractor’s payment bond even though it had received an assignment of two debts from general contractor; supplier had not made an “election of remedies” in accepting the assignment and there was no evidence that the contractor’s assignment discharged the underlying debt upon which the supplier sued the surety.
H. Verby Co., Inc. (“Supplier”) contracted with a Contractor to supply roofing waterproofing and insulations materials for a school roof replacement project. The Defendant, United States Fire Ins. Co. (“Surety”) and the Contractor executed a labor and material payment bond in favor of the Owner. After the Contractor refused the Supplier’s demands for payments, the Supplier brought the present action against the Surety for $61,068.44, the amount of the outstanding balance due.