Construction Dispute

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Dormitory Auth. of the State of NY v. Samson Constr. Co., 2018 N.Y. Lexis 218 (February 15, 2018)

The Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (“DASNY”) undertook, as project manager, to construct a facility for the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the City of New York (the “City”) as a forensic biology laboratory (the “Project”).  DASNY retained Perkins Eastman Architects, P.C. (“Perkins”) as architect for the Project, and Samson Construction Co. (“Samson”) as the foundation contractor.

Complications during the construction of the foundation resulted in 18 months of delays due to the adjacent building settling eight inches, damages to the adjacent sidewalks, utilities and emergency repairs.  DASNY and the City filed suit against Samson, and later joined Perkins, asserting claims against Perkins for breach of contract and negligence.

Perkins moved for summary judgment to dismiss the City’s claims, and to dismiss DASNY’s negligence claim as duplicative of its breach of contract claim.  The trial court dismissed the City’s breach of contract claim; holding that the City was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between DASNY and Perkins (the “Contract”), and allowed both DASNY’s breach of contract and negligence claims to proceed, holding that the claims were not duplicative of each another.

Cont’l Res. v. P&P Indus., LLC, 2018 N.D. Lexis 20 (January 22, 2018)

In 2013, Continental Resources Inc. (“Continental”), an oil producer doing business in North Dakota, entered into a master servicing agreement, governed by Oklahoma law, with United Oilfield Services (“United”).  According to the contract, United agreed to provide transportation, water hauling, and related support services to Continental in support of Continental’s ongoing operations in North Dakota.  The contract also contained the following termination provision: “[I]t being understood and agreed that either party hereto may cancel this Contract by giving the other party thirty (30) days written notice of such cancellation.”

Approximately a year after the parties signed the contract, Continental alleged that United (i) violated state and federal limits and regulations regarding the number of hours a truck driver may drive, (ii) violated Continental’s policy limiting the number of hours an employee could work in a day, and (iii) engaged in improper and fraudulent billing.  Following its discovery of United’s alleged misconduct, Continental terminated its contract and filed suit against United and other related entities.

Strickland v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 17-10610, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 504 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2018)

Strickland provided sand to a paving company (“Douglas”) for a Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT”) road improvement project (the “Project”).  Arch Insurance Company (“Arch”) issued payment and performance bonds on Douglas’s behalf.  In 2007, GDOT declared Douglas in default and removed it from the Project.  In accordance with the performance bond, Arch arranged for a third-party contractor to complete Douglas’s work on the Project. Strickland did not supply sand after Douglas’s removal.
In August 2010, GDOT determined that the Project was substantially complete, and in September 2010, performed final inspection and generated a punch list.  Arch’s contractor completed the punch list by September 2011.  In March 2012, GDOT accepted Project maintenance responsibilities because the Project had been satisfactorily completed as of September 2011.  GDOT made semi-final payment to Arch in July 2012.

In September 2012, Strickland sent a demand for payment on Arch’s payment bond.  Arch acknowledged the claim and asked for additional documentation.  Strickland did not respond.  In 2014, Strickland learned that GDOT was preparing to close out the Project and filed a lawsuit against Arch.

Lathan Co. v. State, No. 2016-CA-0913, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 2277 (La. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 6, 2017)

 
On December 6, 2017, the Louisiana Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to grant the appellee’s, Jacobs Project Management Co./CRSS Consortium (“Jacobs”), motion for summary judgment.  In its opinion, the court of appeals held that a project manager owed a general contractor a duty of professional care and thus, could be held liable to a general contractor under Louisiana law, even if the project manager was not in direct privity with the general contractor.

On August 13, 2010, the appellant, The Lathan Company, Inc. (“Lathan”), entered into a public works contract with the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (“Owner”) to renovate the William Frantz School in New Orleans.  Jacobs, through its contract with the Owner, served as project manager on behalf of the Owner.  Four years later, in August 2014, after filing an original lawsuit against the Owner in 2012 for payment of undisputed amounts due, Lathan filed an amended pleading that alleged inter alia Lathan was entitled to damages from Jacobs under general tort law for negligent professional undertaking and under Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.  According to Lathan, Jacobs owed Lathan a duty of conduct in accordance with a standard of care similar to professionals in the industry and that Jacobs breached its duty of care by failing to (i) disclose mold conditions and the existence of an underground fuel tank at the outset of the project; (ii) timely respond to Lathan’s 400+ requests for information; (iii) perform inspections consistent with industry standards; and (iv) review, certify, and/or approve amounts due to Lathan.

S. Indus. Contractors, LLC v. Neel-Schaffer, Inc., No. 1:17CV255-LG-JCG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196804 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 30, 2017)

This case arises out of the West Pier Facilities project at the Port of Gulfport, Mississippi (“Project”).  Southern Industrial Contractors, LLC (“SIC”), the Project’s general contractor, filed suit for negligence against CH2M, the Project’s program manager and consultant, to recover increased costs incurred while excavating and working around underground debris at the Project site.  SIC alleged first that CH2M owed it a duty to ensure that the Project plans, specifications and bidding documents accurately represented the Project’s conditions, and second that CH2M breached this duty by failing to warn SIC of the underground obstructions it had encountered.  SIC argued that, as a result of CH2M’s breach, the Project became much more expensive and time-consuming.  CH2M filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing it owed no duty to SIC.

The court first recognized that Mississippi law imposes upon design professionals, such as architects and engineers, a duty to exercise ordinary skill and diligence, and further, that Mississippi law allows third parties to rely upon the contractual obligations that a design professional owes to a project’s owner.  The court explained that, because of the design professional’s contractual obligations to the owner, the design professional owes a further duty, sounding in tort, to a contractor who relies upon the design to his economic detriment.  The court recognized that whether the design professional owes such a duty to a contractor is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Tomlinson v. Douglas Knight Constr., Inc., 2017 Utah Lexis 132 (August 29, 2017)

This case arises out of the construction of a residential property.  Lot 84 Deer Crossing (“Lot 84”) purchased the property and contracted with Douglas Knight Construction, Inc. (“DKC”) to build a house on it.  The parties’ contract included a one-year construction warranty.  Lot 84 then assigned to Outpost Development, Inc. (“Outpost”) all of its rights in the property and the construction agreement.  As the home neared completion, Outpost noticed defects in its construction and, pursuant to the warranty, directed DKC to fix the deficiencies.  Despite DKC’s efforts, the defects remained.  Outpost then sold the home to Joseph Tomlinson, but did not assign to Tomlinson its interests in the DKC construction agreement.  Tomlinson subsequently noticed defects in the home and filed suit against Outpost and DKC.
Shortly thereafter, Outpost declared bankruptcy and was dismissed from the case.  During the bankruptcy proceedings, Tomlinson was assigned an interest in any claims that Outpost had asserted or may assert against DKC.  Tomlinson maintained that this assignment encompassed claims for breach of the DKC construction agreement and amended his complaint to include claims for breach of express and implied warranties.  Tomlinson sought to assert these claims as an assignee of rights of parties in privity with DKC: first, through the assignment made when Outpost purchased the property from Lot 84, and second, through the assignment in Outpost’s bankruptcy proceedings.  The district court rejected these theories and dismissed Tomlinson’s claims, holding that they were barred because Tomlinson had never acquired a direct interest in the DKC construction agreement.

WTE-S&S AG Enters., LLC v. GHD, Inc., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2343 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. August 18, 2017) 

This breach of contract dispute arises out of a contract to design and build a cow-manure digester on a farm in Wisconsin.  The digester vessel designed and constructed by Defendant, DVO, Inc. (formerly known as GHD, Inc.), consisted of a 300-foot long tank with two side-by-side chambers which were each 35 feet wide.  A thick concrete cover sat atop the vessel to prevent “free oxygen” from entering the digester.  A center wall ran the length of the vessel, separating the two chambers and also serving as the interior load-bearing wall.

The Debtor/owner commenced this action against DVO, contending, among other things, that the interior center wall footing of the vessel was defectively designed in that it was undersized and not compliant with the applicable code for waste-storage facilities.  Debtor’s expert testified that the undersized and overstressed wall footings could lead to settlement of the vessel and cracks in the foundation, which would compromise its structural integrity.  Debtor’s expert further testified that to properly support the vessel weight, the currently constructed three-foot wall footing needed to be three-and-a-half to four foot wide.

The court agreed that DVO’s design was defective and constituted a breach of the contract because it failed to comply with the applicable code.  However, applying the “economic waste” doctrine, the court denied Debtor’s request for damages of $988,475 to replace the entire vessel or, in the alternative, $655,000 to shut down and clean out the vessel to check for cracks or settlement issues.

P&N Invs. v. Frontier Mall Assocs., 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2017)

This payment dispute arose over conditional language in a lease agreement between a mall and a restaurant operator.  P&N Investments (“P&N”) leased space from Frontier Mall Associates, LP (“Mall”) to operate a restaurant.  The lease contained a “finish allowance” under which Mall agreed to cover some of P&N’s costs to renovate the space, up to $150,180.

The finish allowance was conditioned on the following provision:

[P&N] shall have furnished evidence satisfactory to Mall from its general contractor and any subcontractors that any and all liens that have been, or may be, filed have been satisfied of record or waived and an affidavit that all work has been paid for.

P&N hired CCI as its general contractor, and CCI in turn hired subcontractors, to renovate the space.  P&N paid CCI in full once CCI and its subcontractors completed the work.  The amount paid was $308,930.  CCI, however, failed to pay its subcontractors in full.  The unpaid amount was approximately $90,000.  Mall refused to pay P&N the finish allowance despite the fact that P&N paid CCI in full and submitted an affidavit stating that no liens were, or could be, filed because of time limitations for liens had expired.

Iliescu v. Steppan, No. 68346, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 38, (Nevada Supreme Court, May 25, 2017)

Appellants Iliescu entered into a Land Purchase Agreement to sell four unimproved parcels in downtown Reno, Nevada to Consolidated Pacific Development (“CPD”) for development of a high-rise, mixed-use project to be known as Wingfield Towers, which agreement was subsequently assigned to BSC Investments, LLC (“BSC”).  BSC subsequently hired Mark Steppan (“Steppan”), to provide design services for the Wingfield Towers.  Financing was never obtained for the project and the escrow never closed on the sale of appellants’ property.  In addition, since BSC did not pay Steppan for his services, Steppan recorded a mechanic’s lien against appellants’ property.  However, Steppan did not provide appellants with a pre-lien notice.

In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the actual notice exception for pre-lien notices should be extended to offsite work and services performed by an architect for a prospective buyer of the property.  NRS 108.245(1) requires a mechanic’s lien claimant, other than one who performs only labor, to deliver a written notice to the owner of the property of the right to lien after they first perform work on or provide material to a project.  However, substantial compliance with this requirements is met if the property owner: (1) has actual notice of the construction on the property and (2) knows the lien claimant’s identity.

City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 2017 Ariz. LEXIS 121 (Ariz. May 10, 2017)

Between 1960 and 2000, Carlos Tarazon (“Tarazon”) performed work installing and repairing water piping for various contractors and developers in the City of Phoenix, Arizona (the “City”).  In 2013, after developing mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while working on these projects, Tarazon filed a personal injury suit against numerous defendants, including the City and the various contractors and developers for whom he had worked.

The City filed a third-party complaint against the contractors and developers, alleging that they had agreed to defend and indemnify the City against negligence claims relating to these projects.  With respect to the contractors, their various contracts with the City each expressly required the contractor to indemnify the City from all suits arising from their work.