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Zach Torres-Fowler

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Zach concentrates his practice in construction-related disputes and specializes in complex domestic and international arbitration proceedings. He has advised clients on nearly every continent in connection with projects in the United States, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Zach has represented owners, EPC contractors, and equipment manufacturers in disputes arising from a wide variety of construction projects including power plants, airports, commercial buildings, and other civil infrastructure works.

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Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24671 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2018)

On August 30, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision to compel arbitration between an Alabama steel plant owner and a French division of General Electric Co.  The case is noteworthy because the Court settled two questions of law within the Eleventh Circuit about the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”) and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The first question concerned the interpretation the FAA’s grant of removal jurisdiction to the federal courts.  The second concerned whether an entity could compel arbitration under the Convention despite the lack of a signed arbitration agreement.

Outokumpu Stainless, LLC (“OS”) operates a steel plant in Calver, Alabama that contains three cold rolling mills.  In 2007, OS entered into three separate agreements with an entity known as Fives for the purchase of the mills.  The Agreements each contained an arbitration clause which required all disputes be resolved via arbitration in Germany under the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC.  The Agreements also provided that Fives, and all of its subcontractors, would be treated as one and the same under the contracts.

Fives subcontracted with GE Energy (“GE”) to produce motors for the mills.  The motors were installed between 2011 and 2012.  By June 2014 they began to fail.

Eugene Water & Elec. Bd. v. MWH Americas, Inc., 2018 Ore. App. LEXIS 879 (July 25, 2018)

On July 25, 2018, an Oregon appellate court concluded that a pair of subcontractors could not compel an owner to arbitrate its claims against them by virtue of a “flow-down” provision in a prime construction contract which also contained an arbitration clause.  The case is a reminder that principles of contract interpretation govern the enforcement of arbitration agreements and that courts will not compel arbitration where both parties have not expressly consented to arbitrate their disputes.

As part of an improvement project for the Leaburg Dam near Eugene, Oregon, the Eugene Water and Electric Board (“EWEB”) entered into a prime contract with Advanced American Construction (“AAC”) as the general contractor for the project.  AAC subsequently entered into subcontracts with MacTaggart, Scott & Company Limited (“MacTaggart”) and Olsson Industrial Electric, Inc. (“Olsson”).  When the improvements to the Leaburg Dam failed, EWEB filed a complaint in Oregon state court against AAC and, shortly thereafter, asserted claims against the two subcontractors in an amended complaint.

During the proceedings, AAC sought to compel arbitration of EWEB’s claims against AAC because the prime contract contained an arbitration clause.  As litigation proceeded, both MacTaggart and Olsson also sought to compel arbitration of EWEB’s claims against them.  Problematically, however, because MacTaggart and Olson, as subcontractors, were only in direct privity with AAC, and not EWEB, no express agreement to arbitrate existed between EWEB and the two subcontractors. 

A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transport Auth., 479 Mass. 419 (May 2, 2018)

In a case of first impression, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that general contract principles, and not federal case law, govern the treatment of termination for convenience clauses in state procurement contracts.

In January 2015, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (“MBTA”) issued an invitation for bids for the supply of ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel for a two year term.  Following bidding, the MBTA awarded the contract to A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. (“Prime”) in July 2015.  The contract included a termination for convenience clause that provided:

The [MBTA] may, in its sole discretion, terminate all or any portion of this Agreement . . . at any time for its convenience and/or for any reason by giving written notice to the Contractor thirty (30) calendar days prior to the effective date of termination. . . . (emphasis added).

Approximately a year later, the MBTA determined that it could acquire its fuel supply from a different supplier at a lower price.  Accordingly, the MBTA notified Prime of its intent to terminate the contract for convenience.

Transocean Offshore Gulf of Guinea VII Ltd. v. Erin Energy Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39494 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2018)

On March 12, 2018, in Transocean Offshore Gulf of Guinea VII Ltd. v. Erin Energy Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas became the second U.S. court to recently determine that the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”), as codified in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), applies to consent awards.  Although seemingly inconsequential at first glance, the question of whether consent awards—i.e., settlement agreements recorded by arbitral tribunals as awards—are subject to the New York Convention, has remained the subject of much debate within the field of international arbitration for many years.

In Transocean, the petitioners, Transocean Offshore Gulf of Guinea VII Limited and Indigo Drilling Limited, entered into an agreement to provide drilling equipment, personnel, and services in the waters off the coast of Nigeria to the respondent, Erin Energy Corporation.  Prior to the completion of the contract, a dispute arose and, pursuant to an arbitration clause, the petitioners initiated an arbitration under the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”).  Before the tribunal made a decision on the merits, the parties reached a settlement and, at the parties’ request, the tribunal issued a consent award setting forth the terms of the parties’ settlement.

Cont’l Res. v. P&P Indus., LLC, 2018 N.D. Lexis 20 (January 22, 2018)

In 2013, Continental Resources Inc. (“Continental”), an oil producer doing business in North Dakota, entered into a master servicing agreement, governed by Oklahoma law, with United Oilfield Services (“United”).  According to the contract, United agreed to provide transportation, water hauling, and related support services to Continental in support of Continental’s ongoing operations in North Dakota.  The contract also contained the following termination provision: “[I]t being understood and agreed that either party hereto may cancel this Contract by giving the other party thirty (30) days written notice of such cancellation.”

Approximately a year after the parties signed the contract, Continental alleged that United (i) violated state and federal limits and regulations regarding the number of hours a truck driver may drive, (ii) violated Continental’s policy limiting the number of hours an employee could work in a day, and (iii) engaged in improper and fraudulent billing.  Following its discovery of United’s alleged misconduct, Continental terminated its contract and filed suit against United and other related entities.

Lathan Co. v. State, No. 2016-CA-0913, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 2277 (La. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 6, 2017)

 
On December 6, 2017, the Louisiana Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to grant the appellee’s, Jacobs Project Management Co./CRSS Consortium (“Jacobs”), motion for summary judgment.  In its opinion, the court of appeals held that a project manager owed a general contractor a duty of professional care and thus, could be held liable to a general contractor under Louisiana law, even if the project manager was not in direct privity with the general contractor.

On August 13, 2010, the appellant, The Lathan Company, Inc. (“Lathan”), entered into a public works contract with the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (“Owner”) to renovate the William Frantz School in New Orleans.  Jacobs, through its contract with the Owner, served as project manager on behalf of the Owner.  Four years later, in August 2014, after filing an original lawsuit against the Owner in 2012 for payment of undisputed amounts due, Lathan filed an amended pleading that alleged inter alia Lathan was entitled to damages from Jacobs under general tort law for negligent professional undertaking and under Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.  According to Lathan, Jacobs owed Lathan a duty of conduct in accordance with a standard of care similar to professionals in the industry and that Jacobs breached its duty of care by failing to (i) disclose mold conditions and the existence of an underground fuel tank at the outset of the project; (ii) timely respond to Lathan’s 400+ requests for information; (iii) perform inspections consistent with industry standards; and (iv) review, certify, and/or approve amounts due to Lathan.

Frontier Dev. LLC v. Craig Test Boring Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 149950 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2017)

On September 15, 2017, the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed plaintiff’s, Frontier Development LLC’s, complaint for breach of contract against defendants, Craig Test Boring Co., Inc. and Craig Testing Laboratories, Inc., on the grounds that plaintiff failed to timely file an affidavit of merit as required by New Jersey statute.  The case is a reminder that plaintiffs making claims that sound in professional negligence must be aware of state statues requiring the submission of an affidavit of merit.
Plaintiff was the developer of a commercial building in Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey.  To prepare the site for construction, plaintiff was required to determine the depth of the topsoil it would have to remove and whether the soil beneath the topsoil was stable enough to support the foundations.  To do so, plaintiff engaged the services of defendants to perform geotechnical testing and prepare a soil boring report.  After receiving the report from the defendants and implementing the report’s recommendations, plaintiff claimed that the report’s conclusions were faulty and, as a result, plaintiff removed an excessive amount of topsoil and loose ground underneath the topsoil causing unnecessary delays and construction costs.

Rembrandt Enters., Inc. v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., No. C15-4248-LTS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144636 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 7, 2017)

On September 7, 2017, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied a motion for summary judgment by Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. (“Rembrandt”).  In the motion, Rembrandt asked the court to grant declaratory relief and excuse the company from its breach of a contract with Dahmes Stainless, Inc. (“Dahmes”) under the doctrine of frustration of purpose.

Beginning in approximately 2014, Rembrandt, a large-scale producer of eggs and egg products, sought to expand its business.  As part of these expansion efforts, Rembrandt planned to construct an entirely new egg processing plant in Thompson, Iowa.  After reaching agreements with multiple contractors to build the new facility, on November 20, 2014, Rembrandt entered into an agreement with Dahmes for the manufacture and installation of an $8.5 million egg dryer at the new processing facility.  During the course of the new facility’s construction, however, the Midwestern United States was impacted by the Avian Flu virus which caused Rembrandt to eliminate over a million of its birds in an effort to limit the spread of the virus, cutting Rembrandt’s production capacity by approximately 50 percent.  As a result of the loss in production capacity, Rembrandt decided to scuttle the construction of the new processing facility and subsequently breached its agreement with Dahmes.

Dlorah, Inc. v. KLE Constr., LLC, No. CIV. 16-5102-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11043 (D.S.D. July 17, 2017)

Plaintiff, Dlorah, Inc. (“Dlorah”), filed suit against defendant, KLE Construction, LLC (“KLE”), in connection with an agreement for KLE to perform construction services at an apartment complex in Rapid City, South Dakota.  According to Dlorah, KLE’s actions while carrying out the construction breached the agreement and constituted fraud/deceit.

KLE moved the court to compel arbitration or alternatively stay the proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the parties’ agreement.  Dlorah objected to KLE’s motion on three grounds: (i) defendant had not satisfied the conditions precedent to compel arbitration; (ii) the dispute at issue did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause; and (iii) the arbitration clause was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore permitted Dlorah to file suit in court.  After concluding that the parties had in fact entered into a binding arbitration agreement, the court considered and rejected each of Dlorah’s arguments.