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United States ex rel. Tower Masonry, Inc. v. J. Kokolakis Contracting, Inc.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, 90 Cont. Cas. Fed. [CCH] [[paragraph]] 76,843 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 8, 1995).
Prime contractor properly terminated subcontractor for non-compliance with Davis-Bacon Act requirements. Because cost to complete exceeded subcontract balance, terminated contractor not entitled to reimbursement of value of work completed. 
Defendant J. Kokolakis Contracting, Inc., (“Kokolakis”), a general contractor, entered into a subcontract with plaintiff Tower Masonry, Inc. (“Tower”), for masonry work on a United States Department of Labor project involving the construction of two new dormitory buildings for the Delaware Valley Job Corps Center in Callicoon, New York. The job was subject to the minimum wage levels and record-keeping requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. [[section]]276(a) et seq., and these requirements were incorporated into the subcontract.

Harvey Robbin Co. v. Cristwood Contracting, Inc.,
1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2633 (Conn. Super. Ct., Sept. 13, 1995).
Statute requiring bidder for public contract to list subcontractors did not require bidder to utilize subcontractor where subcontractors bid exclusions were not communicated until after submission of prime bid. 
Plaintiff Harvey Robbin Company, a subcontractor for HVAC (“Subcontractor”) sued Defendant Cristwood Contracting, a general contractor (“Contractor”), in connection with the construction of a physical plant at the University of Connecticut. The Subcontractor alleged, inter alia, breach of contract and detrimental reliance. In turn, the Contractor denied the Subcontractor’s principal allegations, and alleged misrepresentation on the part of the Subcontractor, and that no contract was entered into by the parties.

Tacoma Athletic Club, Inc. v. Indoor Comfort Systems, Inc.,
79 Wash. App. 250, 902 P.2d 175, 1995 Wash. App. LEXIS 406 (Sept. 14, 1995).
In breach of warranty action brought by owner against contractor, contract to furnish and install a “dehumidification system” was considered to be a “sale of goods” governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. pursuant to “predominant factor test.” Evidence was insufficient to establish that owner was entitled to be reimbursed entire amount of original contract plus cost to insulate walls as a result of contractor’s breach of warranty related to dehumidification system. 
The Tacoma Athletic Club (“Owner”) hired Indoor Comfort Systems (“Contractor”) to furnish and install a dehumidification system for an indoor pool. The humidity in the pool area was so high that water dripped from the ceilings and down the walls causing damage to the walls. The system provided by the Contractor failed to reduce the humidity in the pool area. After the Contractor attempted unsuccessfully to solve the moisture problem, the Owner eventually hired a new contractor to attempt to fix the problem. The Owner then sued the Contractor for breach of warranty under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and obtained a favorable judgment.

Cleveland Jet Center, Inc. v. Structural Sales Corp.,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4113 (Ohio Ct. App., Sept. 22, 1995).
Utilization of AIA Document A111, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner & Contractor, 1978 Edition, without express incorporation of AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, left owner free to refuse arbitration. 
Cleveland Jet Center, Inc. (“Jet Center”), a corporation in the business of repairing, refurbishing and modifying jet aircraft, entered into a contract with Structural Sales Corp. (“Structural”), in which Structural agreed to design and build a hangar and office area at the Lost Nation Airport in Willoughby, Ohio. Structural selected the American Institute of Architects (“AIA”) Document A111, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner & Contractor, 1978 Edition” as the contract form and drafted the blank terms.

Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc.; Mosher Steel Co., and Aetna Insurance Co.,
67 F.3d 435, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27614 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 1995).
Contract provision authorizing compensation for delay, “notwithstanding any other provision . . .” held to override “no-damage-for-delay” provisions in other portions of contract as a matter of law. Trial court erred in submitting question of interpretation to jury. 
Morse/Diesel, Inc. (“Morse/Diesel”) was the general contractor for the construction of the Marriott Marquis Hotel in Manhattan’s Times Square. In August, 1982, Morse/Diesel entered into a subcontract with Mosher Steel Company, a division of Trinity Industries, Inc. (“Trinity”) to fabricate and erect the steel members necessary for hotel construction within 13 months, excluding inclement weather. In fact, the job took 20 months, from January, 1983 until September, 1984. Morse/Diesel sued Trinity and Trinity’s bonding company, Aetna Insurance Company, for damages in the amount of $37 million arising from the cost of an acceleration program designed to recapture the delay, as well as losses suffered by the hotel’s owner, the architect and other subcontractors. Trinity counterclaimed for its own damages arising from additional work and delay in completing the subcontract.

Bell South Communications, Inc. dba Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Dekalb Concrete Pro
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11443 (D.S.C. July 27, 1995)
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (“Southern Bell”) initiated interpleader proceedings to determine which one of three Defendants held priority in the debt owed by Southern Bell to the fourth Defendant, Kelly Green, Inc. (“Kelly Green”). Each of the three Defendants were creditors to Kelly Green. In June of 1993, Southern Bell contracted Kelly Green to perform miscellaneous work connected with burying underground telephone cable. Kelly Green, in turn, subcontracted a portion of the work to Defendant Dekalb Concrete Products, Inc. (“Dekalb”). Shortly thereafter, Kelly Green failed to pay Dekalb, Defendant, Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for employment related taxes and Defendant King & Vernon, P.A. (“King & Vernon) for legal services rendered.

M.A. Mortenson Co. v. City of Grand Rapids,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626 (W.D. Mich. July 27, 1995)
For the construction of a water filtration system, the City of Grand Rapids (“Grand Rapids”), as the owner of the project, contracted with, inter alia, Greeley and Hansen to provide engineering services, and Envirex, Inc. (“Envirex”) for flocculation and sedimentation equipment (the “equipment”). After delivery and installation, the equipment allegedly did not work properly, and it sustained stress related damage. Several claims ensued.

Tym v. Ludwig,
1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 974 (Wisc. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1995)
Slander of Title – Lawyer who filed a mechanics’ lien against a homeowner’s property on behalf of contractor that constructed the home was not entitled to summary judgment on homeowner’s slander of title claim because the record had not been sufficiently developed regarding the issue of whether the lawyer had a reasonable ground or believing the truth of the facts pleaded in the mechanics’ lien claim.

Resurgence Properties., Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Construction Co., et. al.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11633 (E.D. Ill. August 11, 1995)
Incorporation by Reference – AIA standard form of agreement between owner and contractor, AIA Document A101/CM, incorporated general conditions, AIA Document A201/CM, by reference even though agreement never specifically identified AIA Document A201/CM. Contractor’s warranty to developer also protects Architect as a third-party beneficiary.

Royal Electric Construction Corp. v. Ohio State University,
73 Ohio St. 3d 110, 652 N.W.2d. 687, 1995 Ohio LEXIS 18905 (Ohio Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 1995)
Prejudgment Interest – Contractor that succeeded on delay and disruption claim was entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date of substantial completion; Ohio rejects rule that pre-judgement interest is only available when claim is “liquidated” or “capable of ascertainment.”