J.P. Altmayer v. R.W. Johnson,
79 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
GSA had planned to order the carpet and trim for the office by August 1992 but did not do so despite repeated requests from Altmayer who tried to impress the importance of this for the contract to be completed

Lahr Construction Corp. (doing business as LeCesse Construction Co.) v. J. Kozel & Son, Inc.,
640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Misc 1996).
This is an action brought by a general contractor against a subcontractor for damages where the subcontractor moved for summary judgment saying that the general contractor could not recover damages

Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Company, Inc.,
342 Md. 143; 674 A.2d 521; (1996)
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) solicited bids for a renovation project. Pavel Enterprises Incorporated (PEI), a general contractor, prepared a bid for the NIH work. In preparing its bid, PEI solicited sub-bids from various mechanical subcontractors. The A.S. Johnson Company (Johnson), a mechanical subcontractor, responded with a written scope of work proposal on July 27, 1993, giving a verbally submitted bid price on the morning of August 5, 1993, the day NIH opened the general contractors’ bids. Neither party disputes that PEI used Johnson’s sub-bid in computing its own bid.

Danis Clarkco Landfill Co. v. Clark County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist.,
653 N.E.2d 646, 73 Ohio St.3d 590, 1995 Ohio LEXIS 1869 (Ohio, September 6, 1995).
County solid waste management district was not subject to provisions of public bidding law in making “designation” of exclusive provider of solid waste management services, but was required only to adhere to bidding procedures it set for itself in its RFP. 
Danis Clarkco Landfill Company (“Danis”), a landfill operator, filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent a county solid waste management district (the “District”) from designating a rival bidder as the sole provider of waste management services for the District. The District had prepared a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) seeking “proposals from qualified bidders to design, construct and operate solid waste management facilities” for the District.

West-Fair Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
78 F.3d 61, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3912 (2d Cir. March 6, 1996).
Neither general contractor nor surety could assert pay-when-paid clause as defense to payment claim by subcontractor because clause, which operated as a condition precedent to payment, constituted a prospective waiver of lien rights and therefore violated New York Lien Law. 
Defendant Gilbane Construction Co. (“General Contractor”) was the general contractor on a construction project in White Plains, NY. General Contractor hired plaintiff L.J. Coppola, Inc. (“Subcontractor”) to perform a portion of the work. General Contractor maintained a payment bond with defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. (“Surety”) for the benefit of all its subcontractors.

H. Verby Co., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
1996 E.S. Dist. LEXIS 3056 (March 13, 1996) (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.).
A material supplier was entitled to recover on the general contractor’s payment bond even though it had received an assignment of two debts from general contractor; supplier had not made an “election of remedies” in accepting the assignment and there was no evidence that the contractor’s assignment discharged the underlying debt upon which the supplier sued the surety.
H. Verby Co., Inc. (“Supplier”) contracted with a Contractor to supply roofing waterproofing and insulations materials for a school roof replacement project. The Defendant, United States Fire Ins. Co. (“Surety”) and the Contractor executed a labor and material payment bond in favor of the Owner. After the Contractor refused the Supplier’s demands for payments, the Supplier brought the present action against the Surety for $61,068.44, the amount of the outstanding balance due.

Stratton & Co., Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co.,
1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 303 (Ga. Ct. App., March 14, 1996).
Provision in the standard form of comprehensive general liability insurance policy which excludes coverage for “property damage to the named insured’s products arising out of such products or any part of such products,” did not apply because the damage the “building” constructed was not the named insured’s “product.”
Stratton & Co., Inc. (“Contractor”) completed the construction of an office building and parking deck for Goldome Credit Realty Corporation (“Owner”). After complaining about the quality of the Contractor’s work, the Owner filed a lawsuit against the Contractor. The Contractor tendered the defense of that lawsuit to its insurance company, Argonaut Ins. Co. (“Insurer”), but the Insurer denied coverage and refused to defend the Contractor. Contractor ultimately settled the lawsuit with the Owner and paid $468,464.

Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering, Inc. and Panda Rosemary Corp.,
468 S.E. 2d 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
Defendant Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering, Inc. (HSPE) was the Design/Build contractor on a co-generation power plant in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina. As the general contractor, HSPE subcontracted with plaintiff Metric Constructors, Inc. (Metric) for construction of the power plant. In turn, Metric subcontracted with a wholly-owned subsidiary, Electrical and Special Systems, Inc. (ESSI) for specialized work. Because all of the designs for the plant prior to the commencement of construction were not complete, the project was deemed “Fast Track.”
Pursuant to its contract with Metric, HSPE was responsible for engineering design drawings and procurement of major equipment items. The contract had an inflexible completion date of October 30, 1990 and, in contract negotiations and in the contract, HSPE promised to issue drawings at a pace that would allow Metric to finish its work on time. The contract further provided that Metric would receive a bonus of $9,000 per day for early completion.

A. Hedenberg & Co., Inc., v. St. Luke’s Hospital of Deluth,
1996 Minn. App. LEXIS p. 379 (Minn. Ct. App. April 2, 1996)
In July 1992, St. Luke’s Hospital of Deluth (“Hospital”) contracted with A. Hedenberg & Co., Inc. (“Contractor”) to build a hospital addition. The contract provided for a 240-day construction period and allowed $500 per day as liquidated damages for work not completed within that time period. The contract also included a provision entitled “Claims and Disputes,” and defined claim as:

a demand or assertion by one of the parties seeking, as a matter of right, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, payment of money, expenses and time or other relief with respect to the terms of the contract. The term “claim” also includes other disputes and matters in question between the Owner and Contractor arising out of or relating to the Contract. Claims must be made by written notice.

Holloway Constr. Co. v. Department of Transportation
218 Ga. App. 243, 461 S.E. 2d 257, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (July 13, 1995).
One of several multiple prime contractors was not entitled to sue owner for delays attributable to other prime contractor — on theory of breach of implied or express obligation — in light of clear contractual provision stating that owner would not be liable for delays attributable to contractors. Contractor barred from pursuing claim for extended overhead and equipment costs allegedly attributable to owner-directed changes in the work and owner’s failure to make prompt decisions because contractor did not provide timely request for an extension of time in accordance with contract.