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Quality Trust Inc. v. Cajun Contractors, Inc.
2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25431 (D. Kan. 2007)
The District Court granted the prime contractor summary judgment on its right to terminate a subcontractor for failure to provide submittals and sufficient work force, while at the same time holding that the contractor was not entitled to summary judgment on the subcontractor’s claims for delay damages and contract balances.
Prime contractor, Cajun Contractors, Inc. (“Cajun”), entered into a general contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) for the construction of a wastewater facility at Fort Riley, Kansas. The project entailed the partial demolition of an existing facility and the construction of a new facility. Cajun subcontracted with Quality Trust, Inc. (“QTI”) to erect eight metal buildings as part of the new facility. Under the subcontract, Cajun was to construct the concrete building pads, to procure the buildings through a third party supplier, and to provide the buildings for QTI to erect and finish.

Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. A. Richard Kacin, Inc.
916 A.2d 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the American Institute of Architects’ (“AIA”) form waiver of subrogation clause barred a subrogation claim even where the loss was created by the contractor’s own negligence. Relying on Penn Avenue Place Assoc., L.P. v. Century Steel Erectors, Inc., 798 A.2d 256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), the court held that a warranty provision did not invalidate the waiver of subrogation and opined that the warranty provision provided a remedy only to the extent that losses were not covered by insurance. The court further held that an insurer does not need to be party to the contract containing the waiver of subrogation clause nor does the insurer need to consent to or have notice of the waiver of subrogation clause in order for it to be enforceable.

Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7808 (3d Cir., Apr. 5, 2007 )
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, despite the commercial practice to the contrary, a subcontractor was not bound by the qualified bid it submitted to a general contractor. The subcontractor’s bid plainly stated that the price was for information purposes only and should not be relied on by the recipient.
General Contractor Fletcher-Harlee solicited subcontract bids for concrete work. As is an industry custom, Fletcher-Harlee stated in its solicitation letter that bids must be held open for a minimum of 60 days and also that the subcontractor must agree to be accountable for the prices and proposals submitted. Pote Concrete Contractors submitted a written bid. However, Pote included a disclaimer in its submission. In the bid, Pote stated that the price quote was for informational purposes only, was not a firm offer, should not be relied on and that Pote did not agree to be held liable for any of the terms that it submitted.

Titan Stone, Tile & Masonry v. Hunt Construction Group, Inc.
Civ. No. 05-3362, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19489 (D.N.J. March 19, 2007)
The Court decided several motions for summary judgment filed by a prime contractor to claims of a subcontractor. Among the motions decided, the Court addressed the duty of good faith and fair dealing attendant to an obligation to evaluate payment applications, the breadth of a “pay-if-paid” clause, whether a monthly release executed with a payment application barred claims for extra work performed after the pay period in the attendant payment application and whether the plaintiff adequately plead its claim for violation of the New Jersey Trust Fund Act.

Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, et al. v. R.L. Brown & Associates, Inc., et al.
No. 1:04-CV-3537-GET, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5261 (N.D. Ga. January 25, 2006)
In Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, et al. v. R.L. Brown & Associates, Inc., et al., No. 1:04-CV-3537-GET, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5261 (N.D. Ga. January 25, 2006), a dispute arose between a surety that had provided a performance bond on a public works project and the project’s program manager. After the owner declared the general contractor in default for defective work, the surety finished the underlying contract under the terms of the performance bond. The owner sought additional damages from the surety. In an agreement settling those claims for additional damages, the owner assigned to the surety all of its own claims against third parties arising out of the defective construction and supervision of the project.

MidAmerica Construction Management, Inc. v. MasTec North America, Inc., et al.
2006 U.S. App. Lexis 3022 (10th Cir. 2006)
In MidAmerica Construction Management, Inc. v. MasTec North America, Inc., et al., 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 3022 (10th Cir. 2006), the Court held that a subcontract agreement contained a “pay-if-paid” clause, and that the clause in question was enforceable under both Texas and New Mexico law. As a result, general contractors did not need to pay the subcontractor for the work that the subcontractor performed under the contract, because the general contractors had not been paid by the project owner for that work.

El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Traylor Bros., Inc.
No. 03-949, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1354 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006)
In El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Traylor Bros., Inc., No. 03-949, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1354 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006), the court construed the effect of a liquidated damages clause on plaintiff’s ability to recover other categories of actual damages. The plaintiff sued the defendant contractor, seeking recovery of liquidated damages, loss of power sales, loss of public grant funds, and other damages related to the late completion of the project. The contract contained a liquidated damages clause, which defined the “damages for Contractor delay” at $500 per calendar day.

Gustine Uniontown Assocs., LTD v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc.
2006 PA Super 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)
In conjunction with its construction of a shopping mall over a non-functioning coal mine, project owner Gustine entered into a standard American Institute of Architect form of agreement, AIA B141, with the project architect ASG. Article 9.3 of the contract stated:
“Causes of action between the parties to this Agreement pertaining to acts or failures to act shall be deemed to have accrued and the applicable statutes of limitations shall commence to run not later than either the date of Substantial Completion for acts or failures to act occurring prior to Substantial Completion, or the date of issuance of the final Certificate for Payment for acts or failures to act occurring after Substantial Completion.”

Beckwith Machinery Company v. Asset Recovery Group, Inc.
2005 Pa. Super. 429, 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
In Beckwith Machinery Company v. Asset Recovery Group, Inc., et al., 2005 Pa. Super. 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), the Court held that invoices for major repairs in the nature of capital improvements to heavy construction equipment were not covered by the terms of a payment bond. The Court reasoned that the repairs referenced in the invoices at issue could not be classified as ordinary maintenance performed for consumption over the course of the project, but rather were services which a contractor would retain the benefit of on the completion of work to be used by him in a like manner on subsequent projects.

LBL Skysystems (USA), Inc. v. APG-America, Inc.
No. 02-5379, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 31, 2005)
In LBL Skysystems (USA), Inc. v. APG-America, Inc., No. 02-5379, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 31, 2005), the District Court concluded that a subcontractor was contractually obligated to continue performance, despite its dispute with the contractor over alleged extra work. Further, the Court concluded that the subcontractor was in the wrong, as its course of performance demonstrated that certain steel work was, in fact, within the subcontractor’s original work scope. As a result, the Court concluded that the contractor’s decision to terminate the subcontract was proper.