Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Thompson Masonry Contractor, Inc., et. al., No. 151780, 2016 Va. LEXIS 166 (Va. Nov. 3, 2016)

The dispute arose from the construction of a student health and fitness center at Virginia Tech. The prime contractor, Hensel Phelps, and its subcontractors substantially completed their work in 1998, and Virginia Tech made final payment in 1999. In April 2012, Virginia Tech discovered defects in the work, elected to repair them, and then sought to recover the costs from Hensel Phelps. Despite the significant passage of time between completion of the work and Virginia Tech’s assertion of its claims, Hensel Phelps could not invoke the statute of limitations because under Virginia Code § 8.01-231, statutes of limitation do not apply to claims asserted by Commonwealth agencies such as Virginia Tech.  Ultimately, Hensel Phelps paid $3,000,000 to Virginia Tech to settle the defective work claims.

Hensel Phelps, in turn, sought to recover from the subcontractors that performed the defective work. When the subcontractors refused to pay, Hensel Phelps commenced an action alleging, among other things, breach of contract against the subcontractors and their sureties. All of the defendants argued that Hensel Phelps’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The lower courts agreed. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.

Tilson Home Corp. v. Zepeda, No. 14-16-00075-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12022 (Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2016)

The Court of Appeals of Texas has held that an arbitrator—not a trial court—must determine whether a prerequisite to the obligation to arbitrate has been met. Thus, when faced with the procedural question of whether an arbitration demand was timely filed, Texas trial courts must compel arbitration, leaving the question to the arbitrator. 

In Tilson Home Corp., Jorge and Lisa Zepeda hired Tilson to build a home on their property.  The contract’s arbitration provision stated:

Any dispute or claim which arise[s] from or relates to this Agreement, the Work and/or the Home will be barred unless the claim is filed with the [AAA] by Owner or Contractor within two (2) years and one (1) day from the date the cause of action accrues.

Jay Jala, LLC v. DDG Construction, Inc., No. 15-3948, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS 150969 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2016)

Jay Jala, LLC was the owner of a motel construction project in Allentown, Pennsylvania. DDG Construction, Inc. was the contractor.  The project was delayed during construction and, four months after the specified completion date, DDG abandoned the project.  Jay Jala terminated DDG for default, completed the project, and initiated this action.

The contract provided that the parties “waive Claims against each other for consequential damages arising out of or relating to this Contract.” During litigation, DDG stipulated that it breached the contract but moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Jay Jala’s damages were consequential, and thus waived.

U.S. Pipelining LLC v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 16-00132 HG-RLP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150767 (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 2016)

This action arose out of the renovation of a condominium complex on Maui (Project). Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) was the general contractor and U.S. Pipelining LLC (USP) was a subcontractor. While the parties disputed who was ultimately responsible for obtaining a license for the work, the Subcontract included a provision that required USP to “obtain[] all licenses and permits required for the prosecution of the Work.” Nonetheless, USP performed its work without obtaining a license from the State of Hawaii. During the Project, a dispute arose between the parties. USP filed a complaint alleging various claims against JCI and others, seeking payment for the additional work it allegedly performed.

Chapter 444 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (the “Statute”) requires contractors to obtain a license before performing any renovation work on real property.

Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise v. W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86100 (W.D. NC July 1, 2016)

Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise (the “Casino”) contracted with joint general contractors, W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company and Rentenback Constructors Inc. (the “Contractor”) for an expansion of the Casino’s facility in Cherokee, North Carolina.  Following completion, two parking decks constructed during the project partially collapsed.  The Casino contended that the parking deck failures resulted from the Contractor’s faulty work.

The Casino submitted a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), asserting contractual, tort, and statutory claims against the Contractor.  The Contractor filed a motion with the Western District of North Carolina seeking to stay the AAA arbitration.  Citing the doctrine of contractual impossibility and due process concerns, the Contractor argued that the arbitration clause in the parties’ contract was unenforceable because it required that the arbitral panel issue an award within 30 days, which the Contractor contended was unreasonable under the circumstances of the complex dispute.

Blackman & Co., Inc., v. GE Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87904 (D.N.J. July 7, 2016)

Grove Street Realty Urban Renewal, LLC (“Grove Street”) contracted with Blackman & Co., Inc. (“Blackman”) to manage a project (the “Project”) to construct a four-story apartment building in West Deptford, New Jersey between 2007 and 2009 (the “Contract”).  The Contract incorporated AIA Document A201-1997 – General Conditions of the Contract for Construction.

GEBFS acquired the Project from Grove Street pursuant to foreclosure proceedings in 2012.  Three years after it acquired the Project (and six years after construction was complete), GEBFS filed a $4,000,000 Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) against Blackman for alleged post-construction defects, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of implied warranty.  Blackman filed an action in response to GEBFS’ Demand for Arbitration, seeking a judgment that the dispute was not governed by any agreements to arbitrate.

Scott Enters., Inc. v. City of Allentown, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 1503 (Pa. July 19, 2016)

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed an order of the Commonwealth Court and held that the prompt payment provisions of the Commonwealth Procurement Code, 62 Pa. C.S. §3931-3939 (the “Prompt Payment Act”), do not mandate an award of penalty interest and attorneys’ fees upon a finding that the government withheld payments from the contractor in bad faith.

On June 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the matter of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016), changing the legal landscape for False Claims Act qui tam claims concerning the implied false certification theory of liability. This article will discuss the Escobar holding and examine relevant considerations for contractors in light of this ruling.

Elliott-Lewis Corp. v. Skanksa USA Bldg., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59406 (E.D.Pa. May 4, 2016)

The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine carved out in Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio – where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that architects and other design professionals may be held liable to third parties that rely to their detriment on false information provided in design documents by architects and other design professionals – does not apply to a contractor that supplied information to design professionals in connection with remedial work performed by the contractor.

ITT Water & Wastewater USA, Inc. v. L. D’Agostini & Sons, Inc., 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 579 (March 17, 2016)

This action arises out of a contract dispute between plaintiff, ITT Water & Wastewater USA, Inc. (“ITT”), and defendant, L. D’Agostini & Sons, Inc./Lakeshore Engineering Services, Inc. Joint Venture (“D’Agostini”), related to ITT’s supply of eight water pumps to D’Agostini on a project to construct a sanitary and storm water treatment and pumping station.  D’Agostini filed a counterclaim against ITT, alleging that ITT’s late pump delivery delayed the project by 103 days.  The trial court granted ITT’s motion for partial summary disposition and ruled that D’Agostini could not rely upon the Eichleay formula for determining its alleged home office overhead damages.  The parties then dismissed, without prejudice, the remaining claims and D’Agostini appealed.