Government Contracts

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James Talcott Construction, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-427 C, 2019 BL 72711, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 4, 2019)

In May of 2010, the United States, acting through the Department of Defense (the “Government”) awarded a contract to James Talcott Construction, Inc. (“Talcott”) to replace existing housing for military families at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana.  Talcott was required to construct thirteen buildings, each comprising seventy housing units.  Each building was to be constructed with concrete foundations and wood framing, and the project’ design called for wooden floor joists and subfloor decking to be enclosed in crawlspaces.  The contract stated that the “structural drawings and specification represent the finished structure… [but] do not indicate the method of construction.  The contractor will provide all measures necessary to protect the structure during construction.”  The plans and specifications were silent as to ventilation of the crawlspaces.

United States ex rel. Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Hirani Eng’g & Land Surveying, P.C., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200829 (D.D.C. Nov 28, 2018).

The case involved the construction of a levee wall on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.  In September 2010, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded Hirani Engineering & Land Surveying, P.C. (“Hirani”) the prime contract for the project.  Hirani’s surety was Colonial Surety Company (“Colonial”).  Hirani subcontracted the majority of the work to American Civil Construction, LLC (“ACC”).  Following a series of disputes and project delays, the Army Corps terminated Hirani.  ACC then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking over $2 million in damages under the Miller Act as well as state law for breach of contract.  After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of ACC.

As part of its claim, ACC sought damages for costs related to idle equipment at the project site.  Although the claim was only a small part of ACC’s overall claim, the court’s approach was noteworthy.  ACC asserted that all of the costs were recoverable under the Miller Act.  Conversely, Hirani and Colonial argued that standby equipment expenses were per se unavailable under the Act.  The court disagreed with both parties and held that, although the Miller Act permitted a contractor to recover for idle equipment, it could not do so in all instances.

IES Commercial, Inc. v. Manhattan Torcon, A Joint Venture, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164973 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2018)

In 2009, the Army Corps of Engineers hired Manhattan Torcon Joint Venture (“MT”) as general contractor to build a biological research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  MT subcontracted with IES Commercial, Inc. (“IES”) to perform the electrical system work.

In August 2013, after IES had completed over 90% of its work, a fire destroyed or damaged more than half of the facility, including significant portions of IES’s work. MT ordered IES to perform significant fire remediation work in addition to the remainder of its base contract work. In November 2013, IES and MT entered into a subcontract amendment referred to as the “Fire Rider,” which included an agreed rate schedule for the fire remediation work, along with a procedure by which IES would perform work at MT’s direction, submit daily work tickets and monthly invoices, and be paid within ten days after MT received payment from its insurer.

Pinnacle Crushing & Constr. LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67965 (W.D. Wa. Apr. 23, 2018)

The Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”), as owner, and Cherokee General Corporation (“CGC”), as prime contractor, entered into a contract (the “Contract”) in connection with work at the Yakima Training Center (the “Project”).  CGC subcontracted with SCI Infrastructure (“SCI”) for certain work related to the Project (the “SCI Subcontract”), and SCI subcontracted with Pinnacle Crushing & Construction, LLC (“Pinnacle”) (the “Pinnacle Subcontract”).  CGC obtained a Miller Act payment bond (the “Bond”) from Hartford Insurance Co. (the “Surety”) to provide coverage for labor and materials supplied in carrying out the work.

After the Corps terminated the Contract with CGC, CGC submitted a claim under the Contracts Disputes Act.  As required by the SCI Subcontract, CGC asserted SCI’s pass through claims against the Corps, which included amounts allegedly owed to both SCI and Pinnacle.

Separately, SCI and Pinnacle sued CGC and the Surety to recover under the Bond for the work they performed under the subcontracts, but for which CGC had not paid them.

Aquatic Renovations Sys. v. Vill. of Walbridge, 2018 Ohio App. Lexis 1581 (April 13, 2018)

This post was published on July 7, 2018 in The Pennsylvania Record.

On May 2, 2012, Aquatic Renovations Systems, Inc. (“Aquatic”) entered into a contract with the Village of Walbridge (“the Village”) for the installation of a new pool liner (“Contract 1”).  Prior thereto, the Village council adopted an ordinance which authorized the mayor to enter into Contract 1 (“Ordinance”).  On April 12, 2013, the mayor signed a new contract for the balance of the work (“Contract 2”).  A few days after Aquatic completed its work, the pool liner began to lift.  The Village then refused to pay Aquatic for the completed and approved work.

Aquatic sued the Village for non-payment, alleging the Village breached Contract 2.  Aquatic also alleged that the Village was liable under a theory of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.  The trial court granted the Village’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Contract 2 was not valid because it did not comply with the Ohio Revised Statute which required the mayor, the clerk, and the Village administrator to authorize all Village Contracts.  Thus, because Contract 2 was unenforceable, Aquatic could not recover under a breach of contract, quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory.

City of Whiting v. Whitney, Bailey, Cox & Magnani, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44943 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2018)

The City of Whiting, Indiana (the “City”) undertook a 26-acre lakefront development project.  It hired an engineering firm to serve as the consultant for the project.  The consultant subcontracted with a subconsultant for marine engineering services, including design of a rock revetment on the lakefront for shoreline protection.  According to the City, the revetment failed on three occasions, resulting in damage to the City’s property at the project site, including a walking path, landscaping and existing trees, a gazebo, and an existing Gun Club structure, which the City had planned to convert to a restaurant.

After accepting assignment of the consultant’s contract with the subconsultant, the City filed a six-count complaint and alleged that the subconsultant’s negligent revetment design caused damage to the City’s property.  The subconsultant moved for summary judgment on the City’s negligence claim, arguing that the economic loss rule precluded liability against it in tort.  The court noted that Indiana’s economic loss rule bars tort liability when there is damage only to the product contracted for itself, but that the rule does not preclude tort liability if there is personal injury or damage to “other property.”

Hope v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28479 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2018)

This matter involved a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (the “Motion”) filed by Richard Alan Hope (“Hope”) and his HVAC company, Powers of Arkansas (“Powers”), asking the District Court to prohibit the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) from continuing debarment proceedings against them.  In 2012, Federal agents began investigating Hope for fraudulently presenting DAV Construction Company, Inc. as a legitimate service-disabled, veteran-owned small business in order to obtain government construction contracts.  Hope was indicted in 2016 for conspiracy to defraud, among other things.  The VA thereafter suspended Hope and Powers from government contracting based on the indictment.  The indictment was ultimately dismissed after the Court declared a mistrial.  In January of 2018, the VA lifted the suspensions, but issued notices of proposed debarment to Hope and Powers.  While debarment proceedings are pending, a contractor may not be awarded government contracts.
The Court first analyzed jurisdiction.  Absent waiver, sovereign immunity shields the VA from suit.

However, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) waives sovereign immunity to allow judicial review of final agency actions.  The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction here because there was no final agency decision as to the proposed debarment.  Indeed, the VA has established procedures for debarment decisions and the proposal for debarment is only the first step.  The Court found that because the VA’s decision-making process had only just begun, and there had been no final agency action, the APA did not authorize the Court to review the merits of the proposed debarment at this time.

Harakas Constr., Inc. v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. App. January 29, 2018)

 BK Partners LLC (“BK”) sought to build a condominium complex in Davidson County.  This required an upgrade to the existing public sewer system.  Therefore BK and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) entered into an agreement whereby Metro agreed to contribute $200,000 to the cost of the sewer upgrade with BK responsible for the actual construction.  BK hired Harakas Construction, Inc. (“Harakas”) to upgrade the system (the “Project”).  Metro was not a party to that contract (the “Contract”).

Harakas encountered unforeseen soil conditions, which resulted in two change orders that increased the Contract amount.  Under the Contract, Metro was not required to authorize change orders; nevertheless, Metro was involved in the discussions.  Harakas performed the extra work and achieved substantial completion.  However, after a defect was discovered in the upgraded system, Metro refused to fund the Project.  When BK failed to pay Harakas, Harakas sued both Metro and BK.  Against Metro, Harakas claimed promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment.  The trial court granted Metro summary judgment based on sovereign immunity.

United States ex rel. Metro Mech., Inc. v. Triangle Constr. Co.,  2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1487 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2018)

Triangle Construction Company, Inc. (“Triangle”) contracted with Mississippi Portfolio Partners III, LP (“Mississippi Partners”) to serve as the prime contractor on four apartment complex construction projects (the “Projects”) in Mississippi.  Triangle subcontracted the HVAC and plumbing work to Metro Mechanical, Inc. (“Metro”).  After Metro completed its work, Metro filed suit in the Federal District Court under the Miller Act, to collect sums due from Triangle and its payment bond surety.  Triangle moved to dismiss, asserting that the Court was without Miller Act jurisdiction because the projects and contracting parties were private.

The Miller Act requires contractors on “public work[s] of the Federal Government” to obtain payment bonds for the protection of subcontractors and suppliers.  See 40 U.S.C. § 3131.  To that end, the Millers Act also creates a civil action in federal court in favor of any “person that has furnished labor or material in carrying out work provided for” under a Miller Act contract and “that has not paid in full within 90 days.” 40 U.S.C. 3133(b)(1).  The District Court applied two alternative tests to determine whether the Projects were “public works of the Federal Government subject to the Miller Act.”

United States v. John C. Grimberg Co., Case No. 1:16-cv-991, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173362 (E.D. Virginia, October 19, 2017)

John C. Grimberg (“Prime Contractor”) was awarded a contract (the “Prime Contract”) to design and complete certain improvements at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia (the “Project”).  Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (“Surety”) issued payment and performance bonds for the Project pursuant to the Miller Act.  The Prime Contractor thereafter entered into a subcontract (the “Subcontract”) with Kitchens-to-Go (“Subcontractor”) to furnish, install, lease and remove a temporary kitchen facility for the Project.  The Subcontract contained a “no-damages-for-delay” clause, which provided that the Prime Contractor shall not be liable for delays beyond its control and that the Subcontractor is “entitled only to reimbursement for damages for delay actually recovered from the Owner.”  The Subcontract also incorporated the dispute resolution procedures in the Prime Contract, which required that all “disputes arising out of Owner acts, omissions or responsibilities” be submitted through an administrative process with the government’s contracting officer under 41 U.S.C. §§7101 et. seq.

The Subcontract originally contemplated a Project duration of approximately 13 months, ending on April 5, 2014, but was ultimately extended until June 27, 2015.  The Subcontractor submitted its Application for Payment to the Prime Contractor, which included $607,221 for extended rental of the kitchen facilities.  Although the Prime Contractor submitted a payment request to US Department of the Navy (“Owner”), for the extended rental and use of Subcontractor’s temporary kitchen facilities, this request was rejected by the Owner.  The Prime Contractor refused to pay Subcontractor’s Application for Payment and the Subcontractor filed a complaint against the Surety under the Miller Act.