International Arbitration

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Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC, No. 17-cv-00224-YGR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111767, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2017)

This matter came before the Court on a motion to vacate a final arbitration award (the “Arbitration Award”) entered in favor of Aspic Engineering and Construction Company “Aspic”) and against ECC International, LLC and ECC CENTCOM Constructors, LLC (collectively, “ECC”).  ECC entered into two prime contracts with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (“USACE”) in connection with two reconstruction projects for police training facilities in Afghanistan (the “Projects”).  These prime contracts incorporated, among other things, Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”) Sections 49.206 and 52.249-2, which allowed USACE to terminate the Projects for convenience.  ECC subcontracted portions of the work on the Projects to Aspic.  The subcontracts between ECC and Aspic likewise incorporated several FAR sections.  Although Aspic is an Afghan engineering and contracting firm, it had experience in contracting with the U.S. government and a familiarity with the U.S. Government contract requirements, including FAR clauses.  After ECC and Aspic had partially performed work on the Projects, USACE issued a notice of termination for convenience, which ended the Projects in their entirety.

Aspic filed a demand for arbitration, seeking to recover its lost profits on the Projects.

Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Carothers Constr., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111021 (D.S.C. July 18, 2017); Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Carothers Constr., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135948 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017)

Two recent decisions from United States District Courts for the District of South Carolina and the District of Kansas, respectively, reached opposite conclusions when presented with the same issue:  Is a surety bound to arbitrate claims against it when the surety’s bond incorporates its principal’s contract by reference, and the principal’s contract contains an agreement to arbitrate disputes.  The District of South Carolina, applying South Carolina law, held that a surety is bound by the arbitration agreement in the incorporated contract, while the District of Kansas held that a surety is not so bound.

These cases both arise from an arbitration demand filed by the general contractor, Carothers Construction, Inc. (“Carothers”) against the surety, Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (“DSI”).  DSI issued performance and payment bonds on behalf of subcontractors Liberty Enterprises Specialty Contractor (“Liberty”) and Seven Hills Construction, LLC (“Seven Hills”) in favor of Carothers for their work on Projects located in South Carolina and Kansas, respectively.  Each subcontractor defaulted on its contractual obligations.  Carothers initiated arbitration against DSI regarding both Projects.  According to Carothers, the bonds incorporated by reference the subcontracts’ mandatory arbitration clauses and thus, DSI was subject to binding arbitration.  In declaratory judgment actions before Federal District Courts in South Carolina and Kansas, DSI asked the courts to declare that the arbitration clause did not bind it to arbitrate Carothers’ claims.  Each court reached the directly opposite conclusion.  This article discusses the decision reached by each court in turn.

Dlorah, Inc. v. KLE Constr., LLC, No. CIV. 16-5102-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11043 (D.S.D. July 17, 2017)

Plaintiff, Dlorah, Inc. (“Dlorah”), filed suit against defendant, KLE Construction, LLC (“KLE”), in connection with an agreement for KLE to perform construction services at an apartment complex in Rapid City, South Dakota.  According to Dlorah, KLE’s actions while carrying out the construction breached the agreement and constituted fraud/deceit.

KLE moved the court to compel arbitration or alternatively stay the proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the parties’ agreement.  Dlorah objected to KLE’s motion on three grounds: (i) defendant had not satisfied the conditions precedent to compel arbitration; (ii) the dispute at issue did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause; and (iii) the arbitration clause was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore permitted Dlorah to file suit in court.  After concluding that the parties had in fact entered into a binding arbitration agreement, the court considered and rejected each of Dlorah’s arguments.

TK Servs., Inc. v. RWD Consulting, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 97239 (D.D.C., June 23, 2017)

This litigation arose from a dispute between TK Services, Inc. (“TKS”), as sub-subcontractor, and RWD Consulting, LLC (“RWD”), as prime subcontractor, in connection with a sub-subcontract (the “Subcontract”), whereby TKS agreed to be responsible for managing operation and maintenance-related services (the “Services”) for the Environmental Protection Agency headquarters in Washington DC (the “Project” or the “EPA Building”) in exchange for a monthly fixed fee and a percentage of profits derived from reimbursable projects performed at the EPA Building.  Pursuant to the Subcontract, all funds received by RWD as payment for the Services performed at the Project and all working capital provided by TKS were to be deposited into a joint bank account to which both TKS and RWD were signatories.

In its complaint, TKS alleged that RWD (1) breached the Subcontract by failing to properly compensate TKS and excluding TKS from accessing the EPA Building, (2) converted the funds in the joint bank account by unilaterally closing the account, and (3) was unjustly enriched by its improper conduct.  TKS also moved for a preliminary injunction to sequester the profits received by RWD in connection with the Project, prevent RWD from excluding TKS from the EPA Building and the joint bank account, and reinstate TKS to its prior role under the Subcontract.

Girolametti v. Michael Horton Assoc., 2017 Conn. App. Lexis 228 (June 6, 2017)

A General Contractor brought claims for unpaid added work, via mandatory arbitration, against a building owner who asserted defective work claims in response.  The Owner abandoned the arbitration mid-process after a partial presentation of its claims.  The arbitrator ruled in favor of the General Contractor, awarding $508,597 in damages, which was affirmed by the Superior Court and Appellate Court.  The Owner then attempted to bring the same defective work claims in state court against the General Contractor, its subcontractors, and the Owner’s testing company on the project.  The defendants all filed motions for summary judgment asserting the defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
The trial court granted the General Contractor’s motion but denied the subcontractors’ and testing company’s motions on the basis that both collateral estoppel and res judicata required privity between those entities and the General Contractor.

The Court of Appeals discussed each motion in detail.  As to the Owner’s claims against the General Contractor, the Court found that the Owner’s complaint involved the same claims of design and installation defects as had been raised or could have been raised in the arbitration.  The Owner had a full and fair opportunity to present his claims against the General Contractor in arbitration.  Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed on the basis of res judicata.

Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. Jan. 23, 2017)

Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the “Flynns”) contracted with Nappa Construction Management, LLC (“Nappa”) to construct an automobile repair facility. The parties executed the American Institute of Architects’ A101-2007 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor.  The contract provided that the owner could terminate the contract for cause; could order the contractor to suspend the work without cause “for such period of time as the Owner may determine”; and could terminate the contract for convenience.

Six months after Nappa commenced work, the Flynns directed Nappa to “immediately cease any further work on the project,” contending that Nappa was not constructing the flooring according to the project plans or industry standards. Thereafter, Nappa submitted a payment application that included expenses for the disputed flooring, which the Flynns declined to pay.  Nappa notified the Flynns that they were in breach of the contract and filed for mediation.  Nappa ultimately terminated the contract for nonpayment.

Bell Prods. v. Hosp. Bldg. & Equip. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9183 (ND of Cal. Jan. 23, 2017)

A Contractor, Hospital Building and Equipment Company (“HBE”) entered into a subcontract with a mechanical subcontractor, Bell Products, Inc. (“Bell”), on a design-build project for a California hospital.  Bell sued HBE, asserting that HBE’s plans and specifications were deficient and failed to meet requirements of the applicable regulatory agencies, resulting in 15 months of delay to the project.  Bell initially sued HBE in State Court.  However, the case was removed to federal court, and the federal court stayed the proceedings pending conclusion of arbitration.

The subcontract provided that:  all claims between HBE and Bell shall be decided by arbitration; the arbitration shall be per the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association; the arbitration provisions shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and “unless [HBE] requests the locale to be the place of the Project, the arbitration locale shall be St. Louis, Missouri.  Bell sought relief from the venue provision, based upon a California Statute, C.C.P. § 410.42(a)(1), which provides:

(a) The following provisions of a contract between the contractor and a subcontractor with principal offices in this state, for the construction of a public or private work of improvement in this state, shall be void and unenforceable:
(1) A provision which purports to require any dispute between the parties to be litigated, arbitrated, or otherwise determined outside this state.

Tilson Home Corp. v. Zepeda, No. 14-16-00075-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12022 (Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2016)

The Court of Appeals of Texas has held that an arbitrator—not a trial court—must determine whether a prerequisite to the obligation to arbitrate has been met. Thus, when faced with the procedural question of whether an arbitration demand was timely filed, Texas trial courts must compel arbitration, leaving the question to the arbitrator. 

In Tilson Home Corp., Jorge and Lisa Zepeda hired Tilson to build a home on their property.  The contract’s arbitration provision stated:

Any dispute or claim which arise[s] from or relates to this Agreement, the Work and/or the Home will be barred unless the claim is filed with the [AAA] by Owner or Contractor within two (2) years and one (1) day from the date the cause of action accrues.

Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise v. W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86100 (W.D. NC July 1, 2016)

Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise (the “Casino”) contracted with joint general contractors, W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company and Rentenback Constructors Inc. (the “Contractor”) for an expansion of the Casino’s facility in Cherokee, North Carolina.  Following completion, two parking decks constructed during the project partially collapsed.  The Casino contended that the parking deck failures resulted from the Contractor’s faulty work.

The Casino submitted a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), asserting contractual, tort, and statutory claims against the Contractor.  The Contractor filed a motion with the Western District of North Carolina seeking to stay the AAA arbitration.  Citing the doctrine of contractual impossibility and due process concerns, the Contractor argued that the arbitration clause in the parties’ contract was unenforceable because it required that the arbitral panel issue an award within 30 days, which the Contractor contended was unreasonable under the circumstances of the complex dispute.

Blackman & Co., Inc., v. GE Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87904 (D.N.J. July 7, 2016)

Grove Street Realty Urban Renewal, LLC (“Grove Street”) contracted with Blackman & Co., Inc. (“Blackman”) to manage a project (the “Project”) to construct a four-story apartment building in West Deptford, New Jersey between 2007 and 2009 (the “Contract”).  The Contract incorporated AIA Document A201-1997 – General Conditions of the Contract for Construction.

GEBFS acquired the Project from Grove Street pursuant to foreclosure proceedings in 2012.  Three years after it acquired the Project (and six years after construction was complete), GEBFS filed a $4,000,000 Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) against Blackman for alleged post-construction defects, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of implied warranty.  Blackman filed an action in response to GEBFS’ Demand for Arbitration, seeking a judgment that the dispute was not governed by any agreements to arbitrate.