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Olympus Corp. v. United States,
98 F.3d 1314, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27509 (U.S. Fed. Cir., Oct. 23, 1996)
 Standard “Differing Site Conditions” clause in Government contract requires, as a condition to recovery under that clause, that the alleged differing condition which serves as the basis of the claim must have existed at the time the contract was executed.

Central Florida Plastering and Development, et al. v. Sovran Constr. Co., Inc.,
679 So.2d 1226 (1996)
Sovran Construction Company, Inc. (“Sovran”) contracted with the Orange County School Board (“School Board”) to construct the Cypress Creek High School. Sovran, in turn, subcontracted with Central Florida Plastering and Development Company, Inc. (“CFP”) requiring CFP to install lath and stucco panels on the exterior walls and to install ceiling framing in the auditorium. The contract between Sovran and the School Board obligated Sovran to pay to the School Board liquidated damages of $1,000 per day, and Sovran’s subcontracts with CFP called for CFP to indemnify Sovran “on account of any such damages and additional costs as a result of delays of CFP.”

Interwest Construction v. A.H. Palmer & Sons,
292 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 1996 Utah LEXIS 44 (Utah June 14, 1996)
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the intermediate court of appeals erred in holding that a tort action for negligence and strict liability arising out of a breach of contractually defined obligations was precluded. However, the Supreme Court of Utah also held that the tort claims should be dismissed because the claimant failed to prove causation between the alleged defect and the resultant injury.

Allgood Electric Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
85 F.3d 1547, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15252 (11th Cir. June 25, 1996)
Under Georgia law, subcontractor’s release of all claims against property on which project was located did not operate to release claims against contractor, nor was contractor entitled to benefit of release in which contractor was not mentioned by name.
Plaintiff Allgood Electric Company (“Allgood”) was the electrical subcontractor on a prison project for the Georgia Building Authority (“GBA”). Defendant Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc. (“Eby”) was the general contractor. Allgood sought to recover increased costs allegedly caused by Eby’s failure to coordinate various aspects of the project. Allgood also claimed entitlement to retainage.

Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8427 (D.D.C. June 6, 1996)
Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals erred in reducing amount of contractual liquidated damages from $1000 to $500 per day; Board should have declared provision unenforceable and awarded actual damages. 
The defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) contracted with plaintiff Kingston Contractors, Inc. (“Kingston”) to remove and destroy existing electrical transformers in WMATA’s rapid transit rail system, and procure and install replacement transformers. The contract contained a liquidated damages provision which provided for $1000 for each calendar day of delay beyond a specified completion date.

St. Lawrence Explosives v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline,
916 F.Supp. 187 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
The Petitioner, St Lawrence, requested confirmation and judgment to be entered upon an arbitration award in favor of St Lawrence and against the Respondent, Worthy Brothers.
St Lawrence Explosives and Worthy Brothers Pipeline entered into a subcontract for construction of a gas pipeline within New York which would connect into an international pipeline. The subcontract was a Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Subcontractor: AIA Document A401. Article 6.1 of the subcontract provided that if the Prime Contract did not provide for arbitration, then disputes would be resolved in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules (“AAA Rules”). Article 6.4 provided that the award shall be final and judgment may be entered upon it. But, Article 6.4 in the above subcontract agreement was crossed out.

Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Reynoldsburg City Schools,
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2751 (June 28, 1996)
No-damage-for-delay clause in contract is not enforceable if the extent and magnitude of the delay was unforeseeable at the time the contract was executed and, therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted where question of material fact existed concerning the foreseeability of the delay.
Cleveland Construction, Inc. (“Contractor”) entered into a contract with the Reynoldsburg City Schools (“Owner”) for the construction of several projects. The contract provided that the Contractor would begin its work in May 1993 and complete its work ten months later, by February 1994. The Contractor, however, was delayed for two months in beginning the project, was further delayed as a result of difficulties experienced by another of the Owner’s contractors, and was at one point required to temporarily abandon its work and return to the project at a later time. In the end, the originally contemplated ten-month project became an eighteen-month project.

Hancock Electronics Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 81 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 1996).
In the spring of 1994, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) awarded Hancock Electronics Corporation (“Hancock”) a contract to provide replacement braking systems for approximately 300 rail cars. The contract required Hancock to design, manufacture and install the braking systems. The contract further required Hancock to demonstrate its contract performance to WMATA and provide certain technical data about the braking systems.
Because it apparently did not possess the ability to monitor the testing of the brake systems’ software, WMATA subcontracted the testing function to a third party. In addition, as part of the testing process, WMATA requested Hancock to provide certain technical documentation, including the brake systems’ software. WMATA sought Hancock’s permission to provide the technical data to the third party responsible for testing, who had agreed to enter into a lifetime nondisclosure agreement. Hancock refused.

Waterfront Marine Construction, Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B and C, 251 Va. 417; 468 S.E.2d; 1996 Va.
In 1988, the North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Group (49ers) entered into a contract with Waterfront Marine Construction, Inc. (WMC) after accepting its bid to construct a bulkhead. The agreement included a provision providing for arbitration of any controversy or claim “arising out of or relating to the Contract or the breach thereof.”
An engineering firm in 1989 inspected the installed bulkhead and pronounced it to be defective, whereupon the 49ers filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) seeking damages, and WMC filed a demand seeking to recover the unpaid balance of the construction price. In 1991, following a hearing, the AAA panel entered an award denying the 49ers’ claim and granting the WMC’s claim, conditional that WMC perform certain work within a certain time limit to the satisfaction of an independent engineer. Unable to agree on the independent engineer, WMC did not perform the specified work and later on that year severe storms hit the bulkhead, causing damage.

Urban Masonry Corporation, Appellant, N&N Contractors, Inc., Appellee,
676 A.2d 26 (D.C. App. 1996)
In November 1990, Urban Masonry Corporation (Urban) subcontracted with N&N Contractors, Inc., (N&N) to install concrete panels on a major construction project in the District of Columbia. Urban was the subcontractor of the general contractor, Blake Construction Company, and N&N was a subcontractor of Urban. The panels were to be supplied by Blake.
Upon installation of the concrete panels it became obvious that the panels were smaller than anticipated, therefore, additional pieces would be needed to complete the project. Because this was beyond the scope of the original agreement, it was agreed between Urban and N&N, that Urban would pay additional compensation for installing extra panels. In fact, Urban’s Project Manager sent a “speed memo” affirming the compensation, and Urban’s President sent a letter acknowledging the request for compensation and promised to pass on the claim to the general contractor (Blake). Subsequently, Urban made a settlement with Blake which did not include compensation for N&N’s claims in November 1991.