July 2017

Iliescu v. Steppan, No. 68346, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 38, (Nevada Supreme Court, May 25, 2017)

Appellants Iliescu entered into a Land Purchase Agreement to sell four unimproved parcels in downtown Reno, Nevada to Consolidated Pacific Development (“CPD”) for development of a high-rise, mixed-use project to be known as Wingfield Towers, which agreement was subsequently assigned to BSC Investments, LLC (“BSC”).  BSC subsequently hired Mark Steppan (“Steppan”), to provide design services for the Wingfield Towers.  Financing was never obtained for the project and the escrow never closed on the sale of appellants’ property.  In addition, since BSC did not pay Steppan for his services, Steppan recorded a mechanic’s lien against appellants’ property.  However, Steppan did not provide appellants with a pre-lien notice.

In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the actual notice exception for pre-lien notices should be extended to offsite work and services performed by an architect for a prospective buyer of the property.  NRS 108.245(1) requires a mechanic’s lien claimant, other than one who performs only labor, to deliver a written notice to the owner of the property of the right to lien after they first perform work on or provide material to a project.  However, substantial compliance with this requirements is met if the property owner: (1) has actual notice of the construction on the property and (2) knows the lien claimant’s identity.

City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 2017 Ariz. LEXIS 121 (Ariz. May 10, 2017)

Between 1960 and 2000, Carlos Tarazon (“Tarazon”) performed work installing and repairing water piping for various contractors and developers in the City of Phoenix, Arizona (the “City”).  In 2013, after developing mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while working on these projects, Tarazon filed a personal injury suit against numerous defendants, including the City and the various contractors and developers for whom he had worked.

The City filed a third-party complaint against the contractors and developers, alleging that they had agreed to defend and indemnify the City against negligence claims relating to these projects.  With respect to the contractors, their various contracts with the City each expressly required the contractor to indemnify the City from all suits arising from their work.

Wood Elec., Inc. v. Ohio Facilities Constr. Comm’n, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-643, 2017-Ohio-2743, 2017 Ohio App. Lexis 1745 (May 9, 2017)

The Ohio Facilities Construction Commission (“OFCC”), together with a school district, an architect, and a construction manager, issued an invitation for bids to build a school. Three prime contractors were chosen: a general contractor, a mechanical contractor, and an electrical contractor, Wood Electric (“Wood”).

The general contractor failed to meet the contractual milestones for either temporary enclosure or full building enclosure, significantly delaying Wood’s work. Wood notified the OFCC of the likely impact on its work soon after the general contractor failed to meet the first milestone, and requested an extension of its own deadlines. The OFCC denied Wood’s request. Wood then requested an extension of time in which to prepare, substantiate, and certify a formal claim, which the OFCC also denied.  Wood hastened to submit a timely claim, projecting an impact of $207,467.57, and reserving its right to supplement the claim when the full impact on its work became known.

When OFCC denied Wood’s claim, Wood sued OFCC in the Court of Claims.  At trial, OFCC acknowledged that Wood had a proper claim, but disputed the $254,027 amount, which included $35,006 for home office overhead.  Wood’s expert testified that he had calculated the home office overhead using the “HOOP” formula adopted by the Ohio Department of Transportation.  The trial court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Wood for the full amount of its claim.

Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 7252 (4th Cir., April 25, 2017)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently addressed whether the City of Baltimore (the “City”) had abandoned a contractually required administrative dispute resolution process and relieved Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. (the “Contractor”) of any obligation to use the administrative dispute resolution process before seeking judicial review of the Contractor’s claims.

The City and the Contractor entered into two contracts (the “Contracts”) whereby the Contractor agreed to build certain parts of a wastewater treatment plant servicing the Chesapeake Bay. The Contracts stipulated that time was of the essence and permitted the City to assess liquidated damages if the Contractor failed to meet the specified completion date.  The Contracts also incorporated by reference the administrative dispute resolution process set forth in the City’s “Department of Public Works Specifications – Materials, Highways, Bridges, Utilities and Incidental Structures 2006,” known as the “Green Book,” which requires contractors engaged by the City in connection with public works projects to seek administrative review by the City’s Department of Public Works of any dispute related to their contracts before suing in court.